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ARTICLES
DEPARTING IS SUCH SWEET SORROW: A YEAR
OF JUDICIAL REVOLT ON "SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE" DEPARTURES FOLLOWS A
DECADE OF PROSECUTORIAL INDISCIPLINE*
Frank 0. Bowman, III**
There's something happening here.
What it is ain't exactly clear
It's time we stop, hey, what's that sound?
Everybody look what's goin' down.
Stephen Stills1
I INTRODUCTION
1998 was a fascinating year in federal sentencing law. In a
series of sentencing cases, United States Courts of Appeals across
the country handed the Department of Justice a small parade of
stinging (if perhaps transitory) defeats. The best known of these
cases, United States v. Singleton (Singleton 1),2 reached even the
popular media.' In Singleton I, before being reversed en banc, a
panel of the Tenth Circuit held that the ancient practice of award-
* © Frank 0. Bowman, I1, 1999. All rights reserved.
** Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis. BA., The
Colorado College; J.D., Harvard Law School. Former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern
District of Florida, 1989-1996; Special Counsel, United States Sentencing Commission,
1995-1996 (on loan from U.S. Department of Justice); Deputy District Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, 1983-1987; Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
1979-1982, and sometime defense counsel. This Article was written while I was Visiting
Professor of Law at Gonzaga University. I am grateful to Gonzaga and its people for
their support of my work. I am indebted to Roger W. Haines, Jr. for his characteris-
tically sagacious suggestions on several key points, and to Daniel J. Freed, Steven
Clymer, Scott Sundby, and Robert C. Bowman for their comments on earlier drafts of
this Article. The Article could not have been written without the diligent and cheerful
labor of my research assistant, Annette Hillman.
1. STEPHEN STILLS, For What It's Worth, on BUFFALO SPRINGFIELD: BEST OF ...
RETROSPECTIVE (WEAIAtlantic 1989).
2. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.) [hereinafter Singleton 1], vacated, 144 F.3d 1361
(10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en bane, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Singleton II],
cert. denied, No. 98-8758, 1999 WL 185874 (U.S. June 21, 1999).
3. See Joan Biskupic, Justice Dept. to Appeal Court Ban on "Deals" with Witness-
es, WASH. POST, July 10, 1998, at A3; Richard A. Serrano, Ruling Against Testimony
Deals Hits Prosecutors, LA TIMES, July 10, 1998, at Al.
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ing cooperating criminal defendants sentence reductions for truthful
testimony against others constitutes felony bribery.4 Less well-
known, but only marginally less striking to the experienced federal
criminal lawyer, was In re Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines's
"Substantial Assistance"),5 in which the D.C. Circuit defied plain
statutory language to rule that sentencing judges have discretion to
reduce the sentences of cooperating witnesses without a govern-
ment "substantial assistance" motion requesting the reduction.'
In my view, each of these cases was wrongly decided, some-
times shockingly so, and the first section of this essay is devoted to
demonstrating the courts' errors.' Nonetheless, considered togeth-
er, these opinions are perhaps an understandable reflection of judi-
cial unease with an important component of the federal sentencing
system - the longstanding, but increasingly common, practice of
making deals with criminal defendants to reduce their sentences in
return for testimony against their accomplices. This Article's second
section will consider the most common criticisms of the system of
bargaining for testimony under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (the Guidelines)8 to determine whether Singleton and
Sealed Case may be good policy even if they are bad law.9 Although
I conclude that the results in these cases are undesirable as well as
incorrect, I also believe that a good deal of the impetus for these
cases has been provided by a continuing failure on the part of the
Department of Justice to properly and discretely manage the im-
4. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1358.
5. 149 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
6. See id. at 1204. For a time the Fifth Circuit aligned itself with the D.C.
Circuit on this issue. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text. In United States v.
Solis, 161 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Solis 1], a panel of the Fifth Circuit
adopted the reasoning of Sealed Case and held that no government motion is required
for a substantial assistance sentence reduction. See id. at 285. The government moved
for reconsideration, and the panel vacated its original opinion, issuing instead an opinion
arriving at exactly the opposite conclusion. See United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 227
(5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Solis Ill.
Two other interesting punishment cases were decided against the government in
1998. See United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(ignoring a plain directive of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to permit a sentencing
departure based on the sentencing court's perception of the severity of a prior "aggravat-
ing felony"); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1998) (discovering a con-
stitutional right to a pretrial adversary hearing to reexamine a grand jury's probable
cause finding that assets seized for forfeiture were traceable to a defendant's criminal
conduct).
7. See infra Part II.
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
9. See infra Part m.
[Vol. XX=
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mense power conferred by the Guidelines to induce witness coop-
eration. Not only has this failure stimulated judicial backlash in
the form of decisions like the two under scrutiny here, but there is
considerable risk that unless the Department exercises greater self-
discipline, Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the courts
may adopt measures which will inflict long-term damage on legiti-
mate law enforcement interests.
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
"SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE": A PRIMER
A. The Birth of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The characteristic feature of criminal sentencing in federal
court before November 1987, when the Guidelines went into effect,
was the virtually absolute discretion enjoyed by sentencing judg-
es."0 In essence, the district court could sentence a convicted defen-
dant anywhere within the range created by the statutory maximum
and minimum penalties for the offense or offenses of conviction."
So long as the judge kept within the statutory range, there were
virtually no rules about how he or she made the choice of sen-
tence,' and the sentence was effectively unreviewable by a court
of appeals.'" All this changed with the adoption of the Guide-
10. For a general discussion of pre-Guidelines federal sentencing, see Frank 0.
Bowman, II, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning
to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 679, 680-89.
11. See David Fisher, Fifth Amendment - Prosecutorial Discretion Not Absolute:
Constitutional Limits on Decision Not to File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (1993) ("Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act,
federal judges enjoyed extremely broad discretion in sentencing. A judge could impose
any sentence she thought was proper as long as it did not exceed the statutory maxi-
mum."); Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 677 (1980) (re-
ferring to pre-Guidelines sentencing practices and noting that "the court's [sentencing]
discretion nonetheless remains quite broad under most modem statutes"); Stanley A.
Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83,
89 (1988) (characterizing the pre-Guidelines system as one of "indeterminate sentencing").
12. For example, before the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
federal law permitted courts to suspend the sentence term for "any offense not punish-
able by death or life imprisonment," and place the defendant on probation if the judge
was "satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the
defendant will be served thereby." 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed 1984).
13. See Koon v. United States, 516 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines sys-
tem, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes,
not reviewable on appeal."); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) ("We
begin with the general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within
the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at
1999]
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The Guidelines are, in a sense, simply a set of instructions for
one chart - the Sentencing Table. 5 The goal of guidelines calcula-
tions is to arrive at numbers that represent positions on the verti-
cal (offense level) and horizontal (criminal history category) axes of
the Sentencing Table grid. These numbers in turn generate an
intersection in the body of the grid. Each such intersection desig-
nates a sentencing range expressed in months. For example, a de-
fendant whose offense level is 26, and whose criminal history cate-
gory is I, is subject to a sentencing range of 63-78 months. 6
The criminal history category reflected on the Sentencing
an end."); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983) ("[Ilt is not the role of
an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the
appropriateness of a particular sentence."). Although the appellate courts lacked the
power to review the substance or length of sentences imposed by district courts, they
retained some ability to review the process through which sentences were determined.
The outer limits of the district court's discretion were set by due process concepts. See,
e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (affirming the appellate court's
remand for resentencing when the original sentence relied on prior convictions obtained
without right to counsel); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (holding that a
sentence based on erroneous factual information violated due process); United States v.
Clements, 634 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that the court would "not review
the severity of a sentence imposed within statutory limits, but will carefully scrutinize
the judicial process by which the punishment was imposed"); Herron v. United States,
551 F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The severity of a sentence imposed within statutory
limits will not be reviewed."); United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973). The Espinoza court reasoned
that
[the] discretion [of sentencing judges] is not, and has never been absolute, and
while the appellate courts have little if any power to review substantively the
length of sentences, it is our duty to insure that rudimentary notions of fair-
ness are observed in the process at which the sentence is determined.
Id. at 558 (citations omitted); see also Fisher, supra note 11, at 745 (noting that before
the SRA there was no appellate review of sentencing decisions); Kate Stith & Steve Y.
Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 226 (1993) ("For over two hundred years,
there was virtually no appellate review of the trial judge's exercise of sentencing discre-
tion.").
14. For a detailed explanation of all aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
see ROGER W. HAINES, JR., JENNIFER C. WOLL & FRANK 0. BOWMiAN, III, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK (1998) [hereinafter HAINES, WOLL & BOWMAN]. For a
more succinct summary of the operation of the Guidelines, see Bowman, supra note 10,
at 692-704.
15. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A.
16. See id. By statute, the top end of the range can be no more than 25% higher
than the bottom end. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A. For further discussion of the "25% rule," see Bowman, supra note
10, at 691 n.49, 712-13.
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Table's horizontal axis is a rough effort to determine the defend-
ant's disposition to criminality, as reflected in the number and
nature of his prior contacts with the criminal law. 7 The offense
level reflected on the Sentencing Table's vertical axis measures the
seriousness of the present crime. The offense level customarily has
three components: (1) A "base offense level," (2) a set of "specific
offense characteristics," and (3) additional adjustments under Chap-
ter Three of the Guidelines. 8 The base offense level is a serious-
ness ranking based purely on the fact of conviction of a particular
statutory violation. 9 For example, all fraud convictions carry a
base offense level of 6.20 The "specific offense characteristics" are
an effort to categorize and account for commonly occurring factors
that cause us to think of one crime as worse than another. They
"customize" the crime. For instance, the Guidelines differentiate be-
tween a mail fraud in which the victim loses $1000 and a fraud
with a loss of $1,000,000.1 A loss of $1000 would produce no in-
crease in the base offense level for fraud of 6, while a loss of
$1,000,000 would add eleven levels and thus increase the offense
level from 6 to 17.22
Chapter Three of the Guidelines provides for additional adjust-
ments to the offense level. These include increases in the offense
level based on factors such as the defendant's role in the offense,"
whether the defendant engaged in obstruction of justice,' commis-
sion of an offense against a government official25 or particularly
17. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, for the rules regarding calcu-
lation of criminal history category. The basic unit of measurement in this calculation is
prior sentences imposed for misdemeanors and felonies. See id.
18. See id. at ch. 3.
19. See id.
20. See id. § 2F1.1(a).
21. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (reflecting an increase in offense level of 2 for a theft of
$1000 and an increase of thirteen for a theft of $1,000,000).
22. The amount of the "loss" is not the only specific offense characteristic for fraud
offenses. Section 2F1.1 also provides adjustments for the specific offense characteristics of
"more than minimal planning," the use of "sophisticated means" to commit the fraud,
jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution and other factors. See id.
§ 2F1.1(b)(2), (5)-(6)(A).
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1. The defendant's offense
level can be enhanced by either two, three, or four levels depending on the degree of
control he exercised over the criminal enterprise and on the size of that enterprise. See
id.
24. See id. § 3C1.1. Obstruction of justice includes conduct such as threatening
witnesses, suborning peijury, producing false exculpatory documents, destroying evidence,
and failing to appear as ordered for trial. See id. cmt. 3(a)-(c), (e).
25. See id. § 3A1.2.
1999]
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vulnerable victim," and the existence of multiple counts of convic-
tion." There are also possible reductions in offense level based on
a defendant's "mitigating role" in the offense' or on so-called "ac-
ceptance of responsibility."29
Just as the characteristic feature of pre-Guidelines sentencing
was the nearly unfettered sentencing authority of the judge, the
defining characteristic of the Guidelines regime is its systematic
restraint of judicial sentencing discretion. Once a district court has
determined the final offense level on the vertical axis and the crimi-
nal history category on the horizontal axis, the Sentencing Table
designates the sentencing range. The judge retains effectively un-
fettered discretion to sentence within that range.0 However, by
design, the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines
make it very difficult to "depart," that is, to impose a sentence
above or below the designated sentencing range. To depart, the
judge must justify the departure on the record either by referring to
factors specified in the Guidelines as appropriate grounds for depar-
ture,3' or by finding "that there exists an aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described."32 Moreover, except in unusual circumstances, the Guide-
lines specifically exclude, for purposes of departing outside the
guideline range, most of those factors, such as age, employment
26. See id. § 3Al.1 (creating an enhancement where a victim was selected based on
"race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation"
and in the case of a victim "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condi-
tion").
27. See id. ch. 3, pt. D.
28. See id. § 3B1.2 (allowing decreases in an offense level of two or four levels if
defendant found to be a "minor participant" or "minimal participant" in the criminal
activity).
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (permitting reduction of two
offense levels where defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility," and
three offense levels if otherwise applicable offense level is at least 16 and defendant has
"assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct" by taking
certain steps). Despite the euphemism "acceptance of responsibility," § 3E1.1 is nothing
more nor less than an institutionalized incentive to gain guilty pleas.
30. See id. § 5C1.1(a) ("A sentence conforms with the guidelines for imprisonment if
it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable guideline range.").
31. See id. § 5K2.0 (detailing the approved grounds for upward or downward de-
parture).
32. This language appears in the Guidelines's enabling legislation, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b), and is repeated in § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines.
[Vol. XKIX
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record, or family ties, that judges formerly used to "individualize"
sentences.3
B. "Substantial Assistance"
By far the most common ground for departures from the other-
wise applicable sentencing range is cooperation with the govern-
ment in the prosecution of others, or "substantial assistance."34
The American judicial system has always rewarded criminal defen-
dants who testify against their fellows, customarily by reducing the
cooperating defendant's sentence.35 Prosecutors historically have
entered into agreements with cooperators to drop or not file certain
charges, or to recommend a lower sentence than might otherwise
appear appropriate. However, prior to the passage of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) and the ensuing adoption of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, cooperation agreements were certainly
a less prominent feature of the federal legal landscape than they
are today.
The SRA and the Guidelines made three changes that, in com-
bination, dramatically affected the process of bargaining for testi-
mony in federal court. First, in the SRA, Congress imposed strin-
gent minimum mandatory sentences for a number of commonly pro-
secuted federal crimes, most notably drug offenses. 6 For example,
33. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines lists factors the Commission determined to
be "not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside
the applicable guideline range." These include age, § 5H1.1; educational and vocational
skills, § 5H1.2; mental and emotional conditions, § 5H1.3; physical condition, § 5H1.4;
history of substance abuse, § 5H1.4; employment record, § 5H1.5; family or community
ties, § 5H1.6; socio-economic status, § 5H1.10; military record, § 5H1.11; history of
charitable good works, § 5H1.11; and "lack of guidance as a youth," § 5H1.12. In theory,
most of these factors nonetheless can justify a departure, but such a departure is per-
missible only where the excluded factor is present to a degree so unusual that the
Commission would not have anticipated its impact and thus did not "adequately [take it]
into consideration," when formulating the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 5K1.1 (authorizing downward sen-
tencing departures on motion of the government for "substantial assistance in the inves-
tigation or prosecution of another person"). In 1993, for example, the reason cited in 72%
of the downward departures granted was substantial assistance. See Robert G. Morvillo
& Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive
Legislation, 32 AI. CRDI. L. REV. 137, 152 (1995).
35. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992) (describing the long historical roots in England and the United
States of granting sentencing concessions, including complete immunity to informants
and cooperating co-defendants).
36. See Russell W. Gray, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and Propos-
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Stetson L. Rev. 13 1999-2000
14 Stetson Law Review [Vol. XXIX
a first offense of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of
powder cocaine now carries a minimum mandatory sentence of five
years imprisonment; 7 for five kilograms of cocaine, the minimum
mandatory sentence is ten years." For a second drug offense, the
minimum mandatory sentence doubles. 9 Second, the Guidelines
raised the sentencing ranges for the two most commonly prosecuted
categories of federal crime - drugs and fraud ° - significantly
above historical norms.4 As a result, drug defendants now com-
monly face Guidelines or statutory minimum mandatory sentences
of five, ten, fifteen years, or more, and white collar defendants who
would in pre-Guidelines days have confidently expected probation
and a fine now confront imprisonment for a period of years in a real
penitentiary." Third, and pivotally, for most defendants virtually
the only ground on which a departure from these stiff sentences
might plausibly be based is "substantial assistance" to the govern-
ing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1337,
1389 n.8 (1992).
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (1994).
38. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
39. See id.
40. Together, narcotics and white collar crime account for roughly two-thirds of all
federal cases. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 733 n.190.
41. From 1984 to 1990, the average federal sentence of incarceration (a figure
which excludes those cases in which probation was ordered) rose from 24 to 46 months.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE
OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYsTEM AND SHORT TE IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN
SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCREVION AND PLEA BAR-
GAINING 60 (1991). Including probationary sentences (counted as zero months), the aver-
age sentence rose from 13 months in 1984 to 30 months in 1990. See id. By 1994, the
average federal sentence (again excluding probation cases) had risen to 65.9 months. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, at 54-55, tbl. 21. The percentage of
federal offenders sentenced to prison rather than probation of other non-incarcerative
sanction has also increased under the Guidelines. In 1987, the year before the Guide-
lines went into effect, 53% of convicted federal defendants were sentenced to a term of
imprisonment. See U.S. DEPIr OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1993, at 494, tbl. 5.22 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L.
Pastere eds., 1994). By 1994, 77.8% of convicted federal offenders were imprisoned. See
id. For a discussion of the increase in drug sentences under the Guidelines, see Bow-
man, supra note 10, at 740-45. For a discussion of the increase in white collar sentenc-
es under the Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping With "Loss": A Re-Examina.
tion of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461,
483-85 (1998).
42. As Justice Breyer, one of the original members of the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, said of white collar offenders, "A pre-Guidelines sentence imposed on these crimi-
nals would likely take the form of straight probationary sentences." Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 50 n.49 (1988).
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ment." Indeed, substantial assistance is one of only two autho-
rized vehicles for departing below a statutory minimum mandatory
sentence."
Taken together, these three changes in the law radically al-
tered the plea bargaining environment and created powerful, in-
deed often almost irresistible, incentives for defendants to cooperate
with the government. There is evidence suggesting that the adop-
tion of statutory and guideline substantial assistance provisions
changed the way federal prosecutors bargain and, perhaps, the way
criminal defendants think about cooperating. For example, although
no statistics exist on how often federal defendants received sentence
reductions for cooperation before the Guidelines, statistics do exist
on motions for sentence reduction under § 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines after the adoption of the Guidelines. The num-
ber of § 5K1.1 motions filed by federal prosecutors increased steadi-
ly in the years following 1987, and by 1994, the government made
substantial assistance motions in nearly 20% of all federal prosecu-
tions.45 During my service as an Assistant United States Attorney
(AUSA) in the Southern District of Florida in the early 1990s, I
vividly recall one cooperating defendant who had been in federal
prison before the Guidelines era telling me, "Before, nobody wanted
a snitch jacket. Now, everybody rats, man."
Not surprisingly, the change has proven controversial. There
have been two major criticisms, one general and one procedural.
The overarching concern of many critics is that in the Guidelines
era the incentives to cooperate are now so powerful that they dra-
matically increase the risk of perjury that always exists whenever
the government rewards witnesses for testimony. For many critics,
this general concern about excessive government leverage is exacer-
43. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (permitting departure below minimum mandatory sen-
tence "[u]pon motion of the government" for substantial assistance). The only other
escape from a minimum mandatory sentence is the so-called "safety-valve" provision of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 and § 5C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which permit downward
departures for defendants who fulfill five statutorily-mandated conditions. This includes
truthful disclosure to the government of all information in the defendant's possession
concerning the offense(s) of conviction and any others who are part of the same common
scheme or plan.
45. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE WORKING GROUP, U.S. SENTENCING COMI'N,
FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES: SENTENCE REDUCTIONS BASED ON DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNEENT (1997) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES] (report-
ing that the national substantial assistance departure rate increased from 3.5% in fiscal
year 1989 to 19.5% in fiscal year 1994).
1999]
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bated by a pivotal procedural component of the substantial assis-
tance mechanism - the requirement of a government motion as a
prerequisite for a substantial assistance sentence reduction. The
government motion requirement is the subject of the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in In re Sealed Case.46 The broader question of whether
the government should be bargaining for testimony with felons is
the issue at the root of the Tenth Circuit's original panel decision in
United States v. Singleton.47 I will address the government motion
requirement first,4" and then consider the bigger question present-
ed in Singleton.49
III. SEALED CASE AND SINGLETON: A DISSECTION
A. In re Sealed Case: Judicial Rejection of the Government
Motion as Prerequisite for a Substantial Assistance Reduction
1. Statutory and Supreme Court Authority on the Government
Motion Requirement
The Sentencing Reform of 1984 directed the Sentencing Com-
mission to ensure
that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing
a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a
sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a mini-
mum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial as-
sistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense.5"
Before the Guidelines went into effect, Congress enacted the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,"' which added subsection (e) to 18
U.S.C. § 3553. Section 3553(e) authorizes departures below
statutory minimum sentences in narrowly circumscribed situations.
"Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority
to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as mini-
mum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance
46. See Sealed Case, 149 F.3d at 1198.
47. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1343.
48. See infra Part IA .
49. See infra Part 11I.C.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (emphasis added).
51. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1007(b), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
[Vol. =XI
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in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has com-
mitted an offense."52
The Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission and approved by Congress in 1987, contained § 5K1.1,
which tracked § 3553(e) in permitting downward departures from
the otherwise applicable Guidelines sentence based on cooperation
and conditioned on a motion by the government. Section 5K1.1
states: "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant
has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecu-
tion of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines."53
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Wade v. United States.54
Defendant Wade pled guilty to narcotics offenses that carried a
minimum mandatory sentence of ten years and a Guidelines sen-
tencing range of 97-121 months.55 During the investigation that
led to his prosecution, Wade provided information to the govern-
ment that led to the arrest of another drug dealer; however, the
government refused to make a motion to reduce his sentence for
substantial assistance, and he was sentenced to fifteen years (180
months) in prison.56 The district court held that it had no power to
depart in the absence of a government motion.57 In a unanimous
opinion, the Supreme Court made several findings critical to the
present discussion.
First, the Court noted that Wade's situation involved both a
minimum mandatory sentence and a sentence within the applic-
able Guidelines sentencing range, and therefore, his request for a
sentence reduction implicated both § 3553(e) and Guidelines
§ 5K1.1.5  Second, Wade conceded "as a matter of statutory inter-
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (emphasis added).
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (emphasis added). Section
5K1.1 originally read: "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecu-
tion of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
[G]uidelines." Id. § 5K1.1 (1987) (emphasis added). In 1989, the Commission amended
section 5K1.1 to delete the reference to "good faith effort." Id. app. C, amend. 290 (Nov.
1, 1989).
54. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
55. See id. at 183.
56. See id. Wade received the mandatory 10-year minimum sentence on the narcot-
ics counts plus five years for a gun count. See id.
57. See id. at 181.
58. See id. at 184 ("Because Wade violated federal criminal statutes that carry
mandatory minimum sentences, this case implicates both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and USSG
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pretation, that § 3553(e) imposes the condition of a Government
motion upon the district court's authority to depart," and did "not
argue otherwise with respect to § 5K1.1." 9 The Court said,
"Wade's position is consistent with the view, which we think is
clearly correct, that in both § 3553(e) and § 5K1. 1 the condition
limiting the court's authority gives the Government a power, not a
duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assist-
ed."'0 In short, the Court held that under both the statute and the
guideline governing substantial assistance departures, the district
court's power to depart is conditional on a government motion."'
No motion, no departure. Moreover, the government has no obliga-
tion to file a motion for a departure even if the defendant has pro-
vided substantial assistance.62
Finally, the Wade Court held that "federal district courts have
authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-as-
sistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal
was based on an unconstitutional motive." 3 The Court continued,
"It follows that a claim that a defendant merely provided substan-
tial assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to
discovery or an evidentiary hearing."' Note the form of this hold-
ing. It does not grant the district court any independent authority
to evaluate the nature or quality of a defendant's cooperation, or to
grant a departure if the court believes the assistance was substan-
tial. 5 The district court's only power is to make a narrowly cir-
cumscribed inquiry into the government's motives for declining to
make a motion, which is a legal prerequisite for such a departure.
If any doubt remained after Wade that a government motion is
a prerequisite for a substantial assistance departure, that doubt
§ 5K1.1.-).
59. Id. at 185.
60. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 187.
63. Id. at 185-86.
64. Id.
65. The Court declined to remand the case for further proceedings because Wade
had not alleged any unconstitutional basis for the government's refusal to make the mo-
tion. See id. at 186-87. In response to the district court's invitation to proffer the
evidence that the defense would produce at a hearing on the failure to make a substan-
tial assistance motion, Wade's counsel "merely explained the extent of Wade's assistance
to the Government." Id. at 187. The Court stated, "This, of course, was not enough, for
although a showing of assistance is a necessary condition for relief, it is not a sufficient
one." Id. at 186.
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should have been laid firmly to rest by the Supreme Court's 1996
decision in Melendez v. United States.66 In Melendez, the govern-
ment concluded that the defendant had provided substantial as-
sistance. However, the government's motion requested only that the
district court depart below the minimum of the otherwise applicable
Guidelines sentencing range of 135-168 months, and did not re-
quest that the court depart below the statutory minimum sentence
of ten years (120 months)." The district court sentenced the defen-
dant to 120 months and held that it lacked the power to depart
below the statutory minimum absent a government motion specifi-
cally requesting that it do so." The Supreme Court agreed.69
The Court considered the injunction of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) that
no substantial assistance departure be granted except "upon motion
of the government," and held that a government motion is a "re-
quirement for a departure below the statutory minimum [sen-
tence]." 70 The Court repeatedly observed that without such a mo-
tion the sentencing court was not "authorized" to grant a substan-
tial assistance departure below a statutory minimum, 1 and that
only the prosecutor can bestow such authority." As Justice Stev-
ens said in concurrence, "[Congress] intended to confer the authori-
ty to dispense with the statutory minima on the prosecutor rather
66. 518 U.S. 120 (1996).
67. See id. at 122-23.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 131.
70. Id. at 130.
71. See id. at 122 (noting that the plea agreement in the case "did not require the
Government to authorize the District Court to impose a sentence below the statutory
minimum" (emphasis added)). The Court further stated that a motion requesting only a
departure below the Guidelines range does not authorize a departure below a lower
statutory minimum. See id. at 125-26. "We believe that § 3553(e) requires a Government
motion requesting or authorizing the district court to 'impose a sentence below a level
established by statute as a minimum sentence' before the court may impose such a
sentence." Id. (emphasis added).
72. See Melendez, 518 U.S. at 126. The Court stated:
[W]e agree with the Government that nothing in § 3553(e) suggests that a dis-
trict court has power to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum to
reflect a defendant's cooperation when the Government has not authorized such
a sentence, but has instead moved for a departure only from the applicable
Guidelines range. Nor does anything in § 3553(e) or [18 U.S.C.] § 994(n) sug-
gest that the Commission itself may dispense with § 3553(e)'s motion require-
ment ....
Id. at 127 (emphasis added). "One of the circumstances set forth in § 3553(e) is ...
that the Government has authorized the court to impose a sentence below the statutory
minimum." Id. (emphasis added).
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than the Commission.""3 The Court read the phrase "upon motion
of the government stating that the defendant has provided substan-
tial assistance" to mean not only that the government must file a
pleading in which it assesses the defendant's cooperation as "sub-
stantial," but also that the government must specifically request
relief in the form of a sentence below the statutory minimum.'
Melendez took the same view of the language in § 5KL.1 autho-
rizing a departure below the Guidelines range "upon motion of the
government."75 The Court said, "[W]e read [§ 5K.11 as permitting
the district court to depart below the Guidelines range when the
Government states that the defendant has provided substantial as-
sistance and requests or authorizes the district court to depart below
the Guidelines range."" In dissent, Justice Breyer contended that
a single government motion should suffice to authorize a departure
below both statutory and Guidelines minima, but he was even more
explicit than the majority that a government motion is required for
a substantial assistance departure from the Guidelines range. Jus-
tice Breyer wrote, "The Guidelines govern departures from these
Guideline sentences, and they permit judges to depart downward
for 'substantial assistance' only if the Government makes a 'mo-
tion... stating that the defendant has provided substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense."
Despite the clarity of both § 3553 and § 5K1.1, in the years
immediately following the adoption of the Guidelines, creative lower
courts tried various means of circumventing the government motion
requirement." For example, in one early case, the Second Circuit
upheld a departure absent a government motion where defendant's
73. Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
74. See id. at 126 ("Papers simply 'acknowledging' substantial assistance are not
sufficient if they do not indicate desire for, or consent to, a sentence below the statutory
minimum.").
75. Id. at 130.
76. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 133 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting the
language of § 5K1.1). Later in his opinion, Justice Breyer said: "[Tihe [Substantial Assis-
tance] Guideline authorizes a sentencing judge to depart downward from a Guideline
sentence for substantial assistance only if the Government files the same kind of motion
that the Government would file to obtain a departure from a statutory minimum sen-
tence, were such a sentence at issue." Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that
a downward departure, under Sentencing Guidelines, was proper without government
motion based upon assistance to the judicial branch).
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cooperation broke the "log jam in a multi-defendant case" in an
over-clogged judicial system, and facilitated the proper adminis-
tration of justice. 9 However, the emphatic rulings of the Supreme
Court in Wade and Melendez seemed, until quite recently, to have
placed the government motion requirement beyond the possibility of
serious dispute.
8 °
2. In re Sealed Case - The D.C. Circuit Breaks Out
In July 1998, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit issued its opinion in In re Sealed
Case.8" The panel held that a district court could grant a substan-
79. See id. at 127. Subsequently, those courts that have considered the question
have rejected sentence reductions based on assistance to the judicial branch. See United
States v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 260, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that assistance to the
judiciary is an improper departure ground under § 5K2.0 of the Guidelines); United
States v. Shrewsberry, 980 F.2d 1296, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lockyer,
966 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1992).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Lezine, 166 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 1999) (stipulating that
a court may consider departure for substantial assistance only in limited circumstances
without government motion); United States v. Licona-Lopez, 163 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the court cannot depart in absence of a government motion);
United States v. Difeaux, 163 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a deputy mar-
shall is not the "government" for purposes of motion); United States v. Santoyo, 146
F.3d 519, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on a "long and unbroken line of cases" to
recognize that a § 5K1.1 motion is a prerequisite for substantial assistance departures);
United States v. Gonsalves, 121 F.3d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding "bare alle-
gation" of bad faith by government in not making motion insufficient to permit a
§ 5K1.1 departure); United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating
that a court cannot address substantial assistance without government motion); United
States v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the government motion
requirement and holding that assistance to the judicial system is not a proper ground
for departure); United States v. Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(upholding government motion requirement even though § 5K1.1 is only a "policy state-
ment); United States v. Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1991) (neglecting to review
whether government's refusal to move for departure was in good faith); United States v.
Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 115-16 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding defendant's good faith efforts to
offer cooperation not sufficient, absent a government motion, to permit downward depar-
ture); United States v. Dumas, 921 F.2d 650, 652-54 (6th Cir.), modified, 934 F.2d 1387,
1389 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a government motion is always required); United
States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the findings in
Dumas); United States v. Sorensen, 915 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging
the government motion requirement and holding that the due process review of refusal
to make a motion available only in "egregious" cases). Of course, not all courts under-
stood the message, and in United States v. Kaye, 140 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second
Circuit upheld a substantial assistance departure without a government motion because
the cooperation was with local rather than federal authorities. See id. at 87.
81. See Sealed Case, 149 F.3d at 1198.
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tial assistance departure without a government motion, because
such a departure was "unmentioned" in the Guidelines and was
thus a permissible exercise of sentencing discretion under the stan-
dards announced by the Supreme Court in Kon v. United States. 2
To arrive at this conclusion, the panel blithely ignored binding
Supreme Court precedent, the plain language of both federal stat-
utes and the Sentencing Guidelines, and ordinary principles of logic
and English usage.
The opinion begins with the astounding statement that in
Wade and Melendez the Supreme Court "never decided whether
departure might be appropriate when the government has not filed
a motion under section 5K1.1."83 This assertion is belied by the
Supreme Court's repeated statements in both Wade and Melendez
that a necessary precondition of both § 3553 and § 5K1.1 depar-
tures is a government motion. As noted above, in Wade, the Court
held that in a case where the government declines to file a motion,
"a claim that a defendant merely provided substantial assistance
will not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to discovery or an
evidentiary hearing."' Again, in Melendez, the Court emphasized
over and over that without a government motion, the district court
was without "authority" to grant a substantial assistance depar-
ture.8 5
Having dealt with Supreme Court precedent by the simple
expedient of ignoring it, the Sealed Case panel turned to its main
argument - that the Supreme Court's decision in Koon granted
lower federal courts the power to ignore the plain language of the
82. See id. at 1204 (relying on Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996)).
83. Id. at 1202.
84. Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The panel in Sealed Case could have
tried to distinguish Melendez on the ground that it primarily concerned departures below
the statutory minimum pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and not departures below the
Guideline range pursuant to § 5K1.1. However, the panel did not even attempt this
distinction, which is unavailing in any case given the Melendez majority's declaration
that, "[W]e read [§ 5K1.1] as permitting the district court to depart below the Guidelines
range when the Government states that the defendant has provided substantial assis-
tance and requests or authorizes the district court to depart below the Guidelines range."
Id. at 131 (emphasis added). See Justice Breyer's even more explicit statement in dissent
that the Guidelines permit a § 5K1.1 departure "only if' the Government makes a
motion. Id. at 133 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's views on the Guidelines are
entitled to special attention because, before joining the Supreme Court, he was a mem-
ber of the original Sentencing Commission which drafted the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL title page (1987).
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Sentencing Guidelines."6 In Koon, the Court considered the sen-
tencing appeal of Stacey Koon, one of the Los Angeles police officers
convicted of civil rights violations for his part in the infamous beat-
ing of Rodney King. 7 Following Koon's conviction, the district
court departed downward from the Guidelines sentencing range of
70-87 and instead imposed a sentence of thirty months.' The
judge gave five reasons for the departure,89 only one of which (that
the victim's "wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provok-
ing the offense behavior") was a reason specifically sanctioned by
the Guidelines. The Ninth Circuit held that none of the district
court's five reasons for departure was proper in this case, but the
Supreme Court reversed.' ° The Court held that the standard of
appellate review for departures outside the otherwise applicable
guideline range is "abuse of discretion,"9 ' and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in relying on victim provocation
and two of the four grounds for departure unmentioned in the
Guidelines.92
More importantly for present purposes, the Koon Court created
a multi-tiered analytical structure for evaluating departure factors:
If the special [departure] factor is a forbidden factor, the sentenc-
ing court cannot use it as a basis for departure. If the special fac-
tor is an encouraged factor, the court is authorized to depart if the
applicable Guideline does not already take it into account. If the
special factor is a discouraged factor, or an encouraged factor al-
86. See Sealed Case, 149 F.3d at 1202.
87. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 86-88.
88. See id. at 89-90.
89. The five reasons were: (1) 'the victim's wrongful conduct contributed signifi-
cantly to provoking the offense behavior,' § 5K2.10M"; (2) because of the "'widespread
publicity and emotional outrage which have surrounded this case,' [Koon and his co-
defendant Powell] were 'particularly likely to be targets of abuse' in prison"; (3) Koon
would lose his job as a police officer and suffer 'anguish and disgrace'; (4) Koon "had
been 'significantly burden[ed]' by having been subjected to successive state and federal
prosecutions"; and (5) "Koon was] not 'violent [!], dangerous, or likely to engage in
future criminal conduct' so there was no reason to impose a sentence.., to protect the
public from [his future criminality]." Id. (quoting the district court decision, United
States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 787-90 (C.D. Cal. 1993)).
90. See id. at 114.
91. Id. at 99.
92. The Supreme Court found that neither petitioners' career loss nor the low like-
lihood of recidivism was an appropriate departure factor. See id. at 110-11. However,
the Court sustained the district court's holding based on the unusual susceptibility of
Koon and Powell to abuse in prison, and because the petitioners were subjected to
successive prosecutions in state and federal court. See id. at 112.
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ready taken into account by the applicable Guideline, the court
should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree
or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary
case where the factor is present. If a factor is unmentioned in the
Guidelines, the court must, after considering the "structure and
theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines
taken as a whole," decide whether it is sufficient to take the case
out of the Guideline's heartland. The court must bear in mind the
Commission's expectation that departures based on grounds not
mentioned in the Guidelines will be "highly infrequent."93
The Koon decision is subject to a number of criticisms." Not
least among these is that the division of permitted departure fac-
tors into "discouraged," "encouraged," and "unmentioned" categories
proves singularly unhelpful in practice because the Court never
explained how the exercise of a sentencing court's discretion differs
between the categories. 5 Read carefully, the Court's opinion says
nothing more than what the Guidelines themselves say - depar-
ture is permitted if the judge finds that a factor, any factor, wheth-
er discouraged, encouraged, or unmentioned, is of a type or degree
that takes the case outside the "heartland" of cases considered by
the Commission in creating the Guidelines.96
Whatever its deficiencies, Koon is clear on two points germane
to the present discussion. First, if the Commission forbade depar-
ture based on a particular factor, then a district court may not
depart on that ground. 7 "If the special factor is a forbidden factor,
the sentencing court cannot use it as a basis for departure."98 Sec-
93. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, m, Places in the Heartland: Departure Juris-
prudence after Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 19 (1996) (arguing that Koon rests on an
unsupportable reading of the Sentencing Reform Act and misunderstood factual data
regarding the relative institutional competence of appellate and district court judges to
evaluate guideline sentencing departures); Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of
Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake
of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1713-45 (1998) (arguing, inter alia,
that the Court's "abuse of discretion" standard of departure review was unjustified); Kate
Stith, The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 14 (1996)
(calling the Koon opinion "puzzling" and contending that it does not permit a "meaning-
ful exercise of discretion by district courts").
95. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96.
96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 5K2.0 (describing grounds for depar-
ture generally).
97. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 93.
98. Id. at 95-96.
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ond, if a factor is "discouraged" by the Guidelines, a sentencing
court may depart only if the factor "is present to an exceptional
degree or in some other way makes the case different from the
ordinary case where the factor is present."99 In Sealed Case, the
D.C. Circuit applied the Koon taxonomy for reviewing departures
and arrived at the remarkable, nay mind-boggling, conclusion that
a downward substantial assistance departure without a government
motion is not forbidden by the Guidelines, indeed is not even dis-
couraged, but is instead a situation "unmentioned" by the Guide-
lines.0 0 Declared the court: "[A] substantial assistance departure
without a government motion is neither encompassed by nor equiv-
alent to any mentioned, encouraged, or discouraged factor, and was
thus not adequately considered by the Commission.... In fact,
where the government files no motion, section 5K1.1 does not even
apply."1 1
This is, of course, transparent poppycock. Nonetheless, some
dissection of the court's reasoning is in order. Faced with the incon-
venient language of § 5K1.1 that plainly conditions a substantial
assistance departure "upon motion of the government" and would
thus appear to forbid such departures without a motion, the court
simply announced: "Applying Koon to this case, we begin with the
obvious: The circumstance under which appellant seeks departure is
not prohibited. Nowhere do the Guidelines state that courts cannot
depart based on substantial assistance in the absence of a govern-
ment motion."0 2
In ordinary English usage, when I say, "Upon the occurrence of
X, you may do Y," the listener understands without further expla-
nation that if X does not occur, then permission to do Y is not
granted. This is the negative implication of a grant of authority
with a condition precedent. Section 5K1.1 says, Upon motion of
the government.. . the court may depart .... ." ' If the court is
at liberty to depart whether the government makes a motion or
not, then the phrase "upon motion of the government" is meaning-
less surplusage."°'
99. Id. at 96.
100. See Sealed Case, 149 F.3d at 1202-03.
101. Id. at 1203-04.
102. Id. at 1202 (emphasis added).
103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1.
104. See Solis I, 161 F.3d at 285 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
reading of § 5K1.1 "renders the words '[u]pon motion of the government' redundant").
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The method of creating a condition precedent employed by the
Sentencing Commission in § 5Kl.1 is hardly unique to the Guide-
lines. As noted above, the language of § 5K1.1 is drawn directly
from the statutory language of § 3553."'0 Exactly the same formu-
lation is used by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in gov-
erning substantial assistance departures based on cooperation after
sentencing.' Rule 35(b) states: 'The court, upon motion of the
Government made within one year after the imposition of sentence,"
may reduce a sentence for post-sentencing substantial assis-
tance. °' The same device appears in the discovery rules where
the government's obligation to produce discovery materials is trig-
gered "[u]pon request of a defendant," ° and the defendant's re-
ciprocal discovery obligations arise only "on request of the govern-
ment."
0 9
The panel in Sealed Case made no effort to explain what func-
tion the phrase "upon motion of the government" serves if its pur-
pose is not to create a condition precedent to the grant of a sub-
stantial assistance departure."' Moreover, any attempt at such an
explanation simply cannot account for the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Wade and Melendez that the phrase "upon motion of the
government" does indeed create a condition precedent to a substan-
tial assistance departure.
Perhaps even more astounding than the declaration in Sealed
Case - that a "motion-less" 5K1.1 departure is not prohibited - is
the conclusion that such a departure is not even "discouraged" by
the Guidelines, and is instead completely unmentioned."' The
court's reasoning on this point has to be read in full to be appreci-
ated, but the essence is contained in the assertion: "Substantial
assistance without a government motion is certainly not a 'semantic
105. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
106. See FED. R. CRIMI. P. 35(b).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. FED. R. CIAl. P. 16(a)(1)(A) (governing discovery of a defendant's statement).
The same verbal device appears four more times in Rule 16(a) on government discovery.
See id. at 16(a)(1)(B)-(D).
109. Id. at 16(b)(1)(A). "If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision
(a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the government, the
defendant, upon request of the government, shall permit [discovery]." Id. (emphasis
added).
110. See Sealed Case, 149 F.3d at 1202.
111. See id. at 1203. "[Ihe Guidelines nowhere expressly discourage departures
based on 'substantial assistance without a government motion,' even though the Commis-
sion could easily have done so." Id. at 1202.
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or practical equivalent' of a substantial assistance with a motion
.... [They] stand as polar opposites."112 Thus, reasons the court,
in § 5K1.1, the Commission encouraged substantial assistance de-
partures when a government motion is made, but the Commission
did not expressly mention, and thus, did not "adequately consider,"
those cases excluded from the encouraged category in which the
government declines to make a motion.' Therefore, a district
court is free to depart without a government motion."
The court is playing word games. Whether a departure factor
properly falls into Koon's "unmentioned" category depends on
whether the Commission "adequately considered" it, not on whether
the Commission wrote into the text of the Guidelines the fact that
consideration was given. The subject of § 5K1.1 is the departure
factor of substantial assistance to the government. In drafting
§ 5K1.1, the Commission evidently "considered" all cases of coopera-
tion, but made a "considered" distinction between cases in which
the government moves for a sentence reduction and cases in which
it does not.
It is as if my eight-year-old son were to bring me a bowl con-
taining a mixture of fruit and candy bars and ask, "Dad, may I
have a snack?" When I reply, 'Yes, if you wash your hands, you
may have a piece of fruit," I do not mean, "Sure have a banana, and
a Milky Way bar, too, if you like, and I leave the decision about
washing your hands to the exercise of your sound discretion." If my
son, having immediately unwrapped the Milky Way and thrust it
into his mouth with his unwashed fingers, were to argue, "But Dad,
your response to my question did not specifically mention candy,
nor did it specifically prohibit me from eating candy without
washing, and therefore I assumed you had not 'adequately
considered' that possibility," his banishment to his room would be
swift, prolonged, and accompanied by stern remarks from the
bench. In a perfect world, Sealed Case would earn for its authors
the judicial equivalent of the same punishment. In what may be a
foreshadowing of just that outcome, the D.C. Circuit granted the
government's petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the portion
of the panel's opinion concerning substantial assistance departures
without government motions."5
112. Id. at 1203 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 110).
113. Id. at 1202-03.
114. See id. at 1204.
115. See Sealed Case, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Oral arguments on the re-
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3. Reaction to Sealed Case
Several other courts have considered the opinion in Sealed
Case. The Third Circuit and a district court in Pennsylvania both
rejected the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit."' The Third Circuit
held that Sealed Case misconstrued § 5K1.1 and that a motion by
the government is a precondition for relief under § 5K1.1." 7 Ab-
sent such a motion, a substantial assistance departure is available
under only three "extraordinary" circumstances - (1) the govern-
ment refuses to file a motion based on unconstitutional consider-
ations such as race, religion, gender, or the like; (2) the government
acts in bad faith with regard to a plea agreement; and (3) "possibly
[in a case] in which the assistance is not of a sort covered by
§ 5K1.1."" s
B. United States v. Solis: The Fifth Circuit Does the Two-Step
For about four months, it appeared that the Fifth Circuit would
be dancing cheek-to-cheek with the D.C. Circuit panel in Sealed
Case; however, after an intriguing flirtation, the Fifth Circuit
twirled 180 degrees and left the Sealed Case opinion alone on the
floor. In November 1998, a panel of the Fifth Circuit decided Solis
I,19 holding by a 2-1 margin that a substantial assistance depar-
ture need not be preceded by a government motion, and unequivo-
cally endorsing the result and reasoning of Sealed Case.120 The
government moved for reconsideration, and in March 1999, the
Solis panel reversed itself, vacated the November 1998 opinion, and
issued a new opinion (Solis II) holding unanimously that a substan-
hearing were held on January 27, 1999. The D.C. Circuit issued an opinion as this
Article went to publication. See Part VTI infra page 67.
116. See United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that
Sealed Case "misapplied Koon" because substantial assistance to the government is taken
into account in § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines); United States v. Gibson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 257,
258 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also United States v. Licona-Lopez, 163 F.3d 1040, 1044 n.3
(8th Cir. 1998) (declining to follow Sealed Case and noting that the portion of that
decision relating to the government motion requirement was vacated pending rehearing
en banc).
117. See Abuhouran, 161 F.3d at 213. ("The requirement of a government motion
under § 5K1.1 is a condition limiting a court's authority to grant a defendant a substan-
tial assistance departure.").
118. Id. at 214. An example of the third circumstance would be assistance in the
prosecution of a civil forfeiture case.
119. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
120. The vote of the panel was 2-1, with Judge Jerry E. Smith dissenting. See Solis
1, 161 F.3d at 285.
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tial assistance departure is not available under either § 5K1.1 or
§ 5K2.0 of the Guidelines without a government motion. 1 These
gyrations merit some brief scrutiny.
The Solis I opinion was, if anything, more distressing than
Sealed Case itself. In Solis I, the district court granted a five-level
downward departure under the "safety valve" provision of § 5C1.2
of the Guidelines. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that this de-
parture was improper. However, the court declared the error harm-
less because its own (apparently sua sponte) examination of the
trial record disclosed that the true basis for the trial court's deci-
sion to depart was the defendant's cooperation with the govern-
ment. 2 Thus, said the Fifth Circuit, the trial court could have
granted a substantial assistance departure without a government
motion.'
The opinion of the Solis I majority made no effort to analyze
§ 5K1.1 or to distinguish the Supreme Court's decisions in Wade
and Melendez. It simply declared that, "We are persuaded by the
D.C. Circuit's reasoning in In re Sealed Case and, therefore, adopt
it."24 In fact, however, in at least two respects Solis I went much
farther even than Sealed Case. First, Solis I abandoned not only
the requirement of a government motion for a substantial assis-
tance sentence reduction, but also any requirement that the defen-
dant request such relief. According to Solis I, a court could award a
downward departure for substantial assistance without request or
input from anybody. Second, Solis I abandoned any pretense of
requiring that the cooperation be of "substantial assistance" to the
government. The record in Solis showed nothing more than that the
defendant talked to government agents four times about "topics
that were relevant to the investigation." 5 There was no indica-
tion that the government learned anything it did not already know,
much less that any information gleaned was of "substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another person." 6 In
121. See Solis II, 169 F.3d at 227.
122. See Solis I, 161 F.3d at 283.
123. See id. at 284-85.
124. Id. at 284. In a footnote, the court quoted portions of the opinion in Sealed
Case and then wrote: "[Wie read § 5K1.1 to mean only that the Commission encourages
courts to depart from the Guidelines when the government makes a motion. We do not
read it, however, to preclude courts from departing under § 5K2.0 without a government
motion." Id. at 284 n.2.
125. Id. at 284.
126. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Solis I, the Fifth Circuit made no pretense of showing, as even the
reasoning of Sealed Case would require, that the defendant's assis-
tance was so extraordinary that it fell outside the heartland of
other cases involving cooperation and thus merited a departure.
Then, in a reconsidered opinion quite as remarkable in its way
as the opinion it replaced, the Fifth Circuit changed its mind. Not
only does Solis II reach a result exactly opposite to Solis I, but it
does so with no explanation whatever of the change. In Solis I, the
panel found the reasoning of Sealed Case irrefutable; in Solis II, the
panel never mentions Sealed Case at all, except to observe in a
footnote that the Sealed Case opinion had been vacated pending en
banc rehearing."7 The court does not explain why the reasoning
of Sealed Case was compelling in November, but did not even merit
discussion in March. Although the second Solis opinion is certainly
correct, even critics of the original result are left with some disap-
pointment that the two judges who changed their votes provided no
explanation for their conversion.
One suspects that the en banc D.C. Circuit will finally arrive at
the same conclusion about Sealed Case as did the panel in Solis. If
not, however, the Supreme Court may be obliged to repeat for a
third time its ruling that a government motion is a legal prerequi-
site for a substantial assistance departure.
C. United States v. Singleton: Substantial Assistance
as Felony Bribery
If United States v. Singleton (Singleton 1) teaches no other les-
son, the case will stand as a constant reminder to lawyers never to
omit even the most implausible argument - there is always the
chance, however remote, that it will fall on the ears of a group of
judges who will buy it. In 1992, Wichita police detectives began
investigating a scheme by Wichita drug dealers to use Western
Union wire transfers to send money to California to pay for sup-
plies of cocaine being shipped from California to Kansas." Sonya
Evette Singleton "was the common-law wife of Eric Johnson, who
regularly bought, packaged, and sold drugs."129 Western Union
documents listed Ms. Singleton as either the sender or recipient of
eight wire transfers alleged to be involved in the drug conspiracy,
127. See Solis I, 161 F.3d at 225 n.1.
128. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1343.
129. Id. at 1344.
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and handwriting experts identified her handwriting on Western
Union paperwork associated with all eight wire transfers.13 ° At
Ms. Singleton's trial for money laundering and conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine, the government also introduced the testimony of
Napoleon Douglas, a co-conspirator cooperating with the govern-
ment. 3' Singleton was convicted of conspiracy and seven counts of
money laundering.'32
The Tenth Circuit's opinion gives none of the specifics of Mr.
Douglas's testimony, and indeed does not even disclose its general
nature other than to say that he "testified against Ms. Single-
ton." '3 We do know, however, that before testifying, Douglas en-
tered into a plea agreement pursuant to which he pled guilty to
some crime and promised to cooperate with the government by giv-
ing information and testimony about the crimes of others.' In re-
turn, the government promised Douglas four things: (1) if, in the
government's opinion, Douglas's cooperation amounted to "substan-
tial assistance," the government would file a motion pursuant to
either 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or § 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for a downward sentencing departure; (2) Douglas would
not be prosecuted for offenses arising out of the transactions for
which he was arrested other than the crime (or crimes) to which he
pleaded guilty (excepting perjury or related offenses if he were
untruthful); (3) the government would inform the federal district
court sentencing Mr. Douglas on his present conviction of the na-
ture and extent of his cooperation with the authorities; and (4) the
government would inform Mississippi parole authorities of the na-
ture and extent of Douglas's cooperation with the federal govern-
ment.13 5
Before trial, Singleton moved to suppress Douglas's testimony
on the ground that the government had impermissibly promised
Douglas something of value in return for his testimony, in violation
of the federal witness bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)." 6 The
district court denied the motion, and after the trial, in which Doug-
las testified, defendant Singleton was convicted on all charges." 7
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1343.
133. Id. at 1344.
134. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1344.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1343.
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Singleton renewed her bribery argument in the Tenth Circuit, and
in an opinion that sent shock waves through the national criminal
justice community,s the three-judge panel held unanimously that
the AUSA violated § 201(c)(2) by promising leniency to Douglas
conditioned on his testimony."9 The court went on to find that by
violating the federal criminal statute, the AUSA also violated Kan-
sas Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b), and therefore,
suppression of Douglas's testimony was required.
40
The federal bribery statute reads as follows:
Whoever... directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises any-
thing of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under
oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a wit-
ness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any
court... authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evi-
dence or take testimony... shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned for not more than two years, or both.41
The panel's opinion rests on two premises. First, the language
of § 201(c)(2) "could not be more clear," and on its face prohibits
prosecutors from bargaining for testimony.12 "Whoever" means
138. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Shot Down in Mid-Theory, A.B. J., May 1999, at 46
(discussing the Singleton case); David R. Rovella, 10th Circuit: Plea Deals Aren't Bribery,
NAr'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1999, at AS; Plea Bargaining Ban Puts on Full-Court Press, N.J.
LAW., Nov. 9, 1998, at 2; Biskupic, supra note 3; Serrano, supra note 3.
139. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1351.
140. See id. at 1358. The court's finding of a state ethical violation by a federal
prosecutor, and its use of that supposed violation as an excuse for the suppression of
evidence is deeply problematic, though it raises issues beyond the scope of this Article.
Among the more notable difficulties with this aspect of the panel's opinion is its state-
ment that "the federal courts have unanimously rejected the notion that federal prosecu-
tors are exempt from these [state) ethical rules." Id. at 1354. This is flatly untrue. See,
e.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
enforcement of a state rule regarding attorney subpoenas violated the Supremacy
Clause). Moreover, the Singleton opinion ignores another opinion of the Tenth Circuit it-
self, United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 1996), which
strongly intimates exactly the contrary result. See id. at 1165. For a more complete
treatment of other authority, pro and con, see Frank 0. Bowman, Il, A Bludgeon by
Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical Rules" Against Prosecutors to Control the Law
of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665 (1996). After gliding without analysis over the
troublesome question of whether a federal prosecutor can be held to state ethical rules,
the Singleton panel leaps with no analysis or citation to the conclusion that such a
violation is a ground for evidentiary suppression, as opposed to personal professional
sanctions. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1354.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1986).
142. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1345.
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whoever. Second, offering leniency for testimony is pernicious and
should be prohibited.'
The judicial process is tainted and justice cheapened when factual
testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or money. Because
prosecutors bear a weighty responsibility to do justice and observe
the law in the course of a prosecution, it is particularly appropri-
ate to apply the strictures of § 201(c)(2) to their activities.'
Despite its ringing rhetoric and voluminous citations, 45 the opin-
ion fails as a work of statutory interpretation.
The court is, of course, correct that the language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(2), read on its face, seems to apply to everyone, including
the government. Equally plain is the fact that absolutely no one,
most particularly including Congress, intended the law to apply to
plea bargaining with cooperators. This lack of intention is discern-
ible from events both before and after the passage of § 201(c)(2) in
1962.146 First, bargaining with defendants for testimony was a
well-established and judicially condoned practice for centuries prior
to the adoption of § 201(c)(2). 47 The United States Supreme Court
recognized the practice as early as 1878 in The Whiskey Cases."
In 1966, four years after the enactment of § 201(c)(2), the Supreme
Court responded to an attack on the use of informant testimony as
contrary to Anglo-American legal tradition with these words:
143. See id. at 1346.
144. Id. at 1347. The panel also wrote:
If justice is perverted when a criminal defendant seeks to buy testimony from
a witness, it is no less perverted when the government does so. Because
§ 201(c)(2) addresses what Congress perceived to be a wrong, and operates to
prevent fraud upon the federal courts in the form of inherently unreliable testi-
mony, the proscription of 201(c)(2) must apply to the government.
Id. at 1346.
145. At one point the panel cites the Bible, the Magna Carta, a seventeenth-century
treatise by Samuel Rutherford, and Justice Brandeis all in a single paragraph. See id. at
1346-47.
146. See Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (1962).
147. See Hughes, supra note 35, at 7-8.
148. 99 U.S. 594 (1878). The Court wrote:
Prosecutors ... should explain to the accomplice that he is not obliged to
criminate himself, and inform him just what he may reasonably expect in case
he acts in good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as to his own acts in the
case, and those of his associates. When he ftulflls those conditions he is equita-
bly entitled to a pardon, and the prosecutor, and the court if need be, when
fully informed of the facts, will join in such a recommendation.
Id. at 604.
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Insofar as the general attack upon the use of informers is based
upon historic "notions" of "English-speaking peoples," it is without
historical foundation. In the words of Judge Learned Hand,
"Courts have countenanced the use of informers from time imme-
morial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the crime
consists of preparing for another crime, it is usually necessary to
rely upon them or upon accomplices because the criminals will
almost certainly proceed covertly."
The petitioner is quite correct in the contention that [the
informant who testified in this case], perhaps even more than
most informers, may have had motives to lie. But it does not fol-
low that his testimony was untrue, nor does it follow that his
testimony was constitutionally inadmissible. The established safe-
guards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a
witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of
his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury."'
As the Fifth Circuit opined in 1987, "No practice is more ingrained
in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government
calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the
defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea
bargain that promises him a reduced sentence."50 The Singleton I
panel made no effort to address the universal judicial acceptance of
bargained-for testimony before and after the enactment of
§ 201(c)(2), other than to mention rather weakly that the historical
record "give[s] us pause."'
Of course, the fact that a practice is deeply ingrained in the
legal culture does not prohibit Congress from changing it. Nonethe-
less, when a litigant urges upon a court a construction of a statute
that would prohibit, indeed criminalize, a practice settled for centu-
ries, the court has an obligation to inquire as to whether Congress
really intended so revolutionary a result.5 2 In the case of
149. United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (quoting United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950)).
150. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("In short, the right on
the part of the prosecutor to make promises of leniency in exchange for testimony is as
old as the institution of the criminal trial.").
151. Singleton T, 144 F.3d at 1352. ("Although the government's apparent practice of
giving inducements for testimony, as opposed to other forms of cooperation, and the
judiciary's seeming approval of such practice give us pause, they do not alter the words
of a clear statute.").
152. As the Supreme Court said in Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
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§ 201(c)(2), not a word in the legislative history signals an intention
to criminalize government bargaining for testimony.'53 The re-
sponse of the Singleton I panel was to say, "We find no clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention contradicting the statute's lan-
guage." " Of course, this retort misses the point entirely. Con-
gressional silence only reinforces the conclusion that no one in Con-
gress ever considered the possibility that § 201(c)(2) would be in-
voked against the government itself to prohibit bargaining for testi-
mony.
More important to the interpretive question than to settled
practice, however longstanding, is the fact that Congress has re-
peatedly, and expressly, sanctioned and regulated the exchange of
leniency for testimony. The federal witness immunity statutes,
passed as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, require
courts, upon motion of the government, to confer immunity on wit-
nesses who testify for the government.' The statute dealing with
witness relocation and protection, passed as part of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984, allows the government to make
monetary payments to and create whole new identities for cooperat-
ing witnesses.'56 Most importantly, as noted above, the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, particularly 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(n), authorized judges to reduce sentences below statutory
minimums for cooperators and mandated that the Sentencing Com-
mission create sentencing rules that take substantial assistance to
the government into account. In response, the Sentencing Commis-
sion drafted guidelines and policy statements, which included
§ 5K1.1 on substantial assistance departures, and Congress accept-
ed them.'57 Section 5K1.1(a)(2) states that, "The appropriate re-
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991):
Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudi-
catory principles. Thus, where a common-law principle is well established...
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expec-
tation that the principle will apply except "when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident."
Id. at 108 (citations omitted) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952)).
153. See H.R. REp. No. 87-748 (1961).
154. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1352.
155. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994).
156. See id. § 3521.
157. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 consigned to the Sentencing Commission
the responsibility of drafting, promulgating, and periodically amending sentencing guide-
lines. The guidelines and amendments are submitted to Congress for its review and go
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duction [for substantial assistance] shall be determined by the court
for reasons stated that may include... the truthfulness, complete-
ness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the
defendant." 158
In addition, in § 215(b) of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Congress itself directly amended Rule 35(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit reductions in sentence
for cooperation within a year after the original sentencing date."9
The statutorily amended rule read:
(b) CORRECTION OF SENTENCE FOR CHANGED CIRCUM-
STANCES. - The court, on motion of the Government, made
within one year after the imposition of the sentence, may reduce a
sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense, to the extent that such assistance is a
factor in applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a).'
In 1987, Congress, by statute, made the provisions of Rule 35(b)
applicable to pre-Guidelines sentences.'' Thus, Congress itself
has twice adopted by reference the standards for sentence reduction
in § 5K1.1, including the requirement of truthful, complete, and
reliable testimony.
In short, the interpretation of § 201(c)(2) urged by Ms. Single-
ton conflicts squarely with a bushel of congressionally enacted or
approved statutes, guidelines, and procedural rules that endorse
and regulate sentence bargaining for testimony. The Singleton
panel recognized the canon of statutory construction directing that
apparently conflicting statutes should, if possible, be interpreted to
give effect to each. 62 But rather than taking the obvious tack of
into effect on November 1 of the year in which they are promulgated unless "modified or
disapproved by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
158. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUINES MANUAL § 5K1.1(a)(2) (emphasis added).
159. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 215(b), 99 Stat. 1837, 2016 (1984).
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 22, 101 Stat. 1266, 1271 (1987).
162. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1348 (noting "our duty to harmonize apparently
conflicting statutes whenever possible"). This canon has been stated in various ways. See
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 739 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
('[Wihere text permits, statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted
harmoniously."); Rev. Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom
and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 MIss. L.J. 225, 319 (1998)
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concluding that § 201(c)(2) does not apply to bargained-for testimo-
ny, the panel distorted the statutes that authorize the practice. The
panel contended that the federal immunity statutes do not conflict
with § 201(c)(2) because the government does not grant immunity
itself, but can only petition the court to do so." Of course, the
same is true of virtually all bargains involving sentencing leniency
in return for testimony (with the exception of a promise to dismiss
or not file charges). Neither before nor after the advent of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines could a prosecutor lower the sentence unilateral-
ly. "' All the government can promise or deliver is a recommenda-
tion to the judge that the court exercise its discretion to reduce the
penalty. If, as the panel would have it, § 201(c)(2) prohibits the
government as well as private parties from rewarding testimony, it
is of no consequence that the government actor who bestows the
reward works for the judicial rather than the executive branch.
The Singleton I panel then "harmonized" § 201(c)(2) with 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e), § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines, and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure Rule 35(b) by declaring that "'substantial
assistance' does not include testimony."65 Rather sentence reduc-
tions are permitted for "all forms of substantial assistance other
than testimony."'66 This is almost painfully silly. It distorts the
plain meaning and indisputable purpose of the Sentencing Reform
Act, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Those laws were enacted not to facilitate general law
enforcement intelligence gathering, but to provide the leverage
necessary to secure the testimony of criminals against their associ-
ates and accomplices.
Moreover, the panel's tortured reading of the Act, the Guide-
lines, and the Rules fails to accomplish the panel's policy goal -
preventing the government from "perverting justice" by "buying
testimony."67 In truth, in a legal world governed by the Singleton
I opinion, all the actors would behave almost identically to the way
they do now - they would enter cooperation agreements, give and
receive information, testify at trial, and seek and award sentence
("[Llegal texts in pari materia are to be read together."); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405, 458 (1989) (asserting that
"statutes regulating the same subject should be construed harmoniously").
163. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1348.
164. See id. at 1355.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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reductions thereafter. Everyone would understand that full and
satisfactory "substantial assistance" is incomplete without truthful
testimony. The only difference would be that everyone would avoid
writing or speaking the taboo words "in consideration of your testi-
mony." Indeed, the panel tacitly conceded as much, saying: "Nor
will our holding drastically alter the government's present prac-
tices. The government may still make deals with accomplices for
their assistance other than testimony, and it may still put accompli-
ces on the stand; it simply may not attach any promise, offer, or gift
to their testimony."'68 Thus, the Singleton I panel argues at one
time that the practice of rewarding testimony with sentence reduc-
tions so corrupts the integrity of the judicial process that exclusion
of the tainted evidence is required to deter the "unlawful con-
duct,"'69 and at another time, that the court's interpretation of
§ 201(c)(2) is permissible because it really would not change all that
much.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the panel opinion in Singleton I did
not long survive. The Tenth Circuit took the unusual step of vacat-
ing the panel opinion and ordering rehearing en banc on its own
motion.'7 ° On January 8, 1999, the full court issued a new opinion
(Singleton II) holding that § 201(c)(2) does not extend to prosecutors
who bargain with defendants for testimony. 7' All members of the
court concurred in the result except for the three judges on the
original panel. 72 The majority opinion took a narrowly semantic
approach. Judge Porfilio, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
word "whoever," in the statutory phrase "whoever ... gives, offers,
or promises anything of value to any person" for testimony, refers
only to natural persons and thus cannot cover an AUSA negotiating
a substantial assistance agreement because, when doing so, she is
the "alter ego" of the government itself.'73 Prosecuting the govern-
168. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1355.
169. Id. at 1359.
170. See id. at 1361.
171. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1298. In the interval between the panel decision
in July 1998, and the en banc opinion in January 1999, the panel's conclusions also
received rough treatment at the hands of judges from other circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. Malszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1015 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jones, 160
F.3d 473, 482 n.7 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 535 (E.D.
Va. 1998).
172. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1308. Judges Henry and Lucero each filed a sep-
arate concurrence. See id. at 1302-03. Judges Kelley, Seymour, and Ebel dissented. See
id. at 1308.
173. Id. at 1300.
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ment itself for violating § 201(c)(2) would be an "absurdity," so a
construction of § 201(c)(2) that embraces such an absurdity is nec-
essarily incorrect.174 In addition, the en banc majority noted the
irreconcilable conflict between the panel's reading of § 201(c)(2) and
statutes such as the Sentencing Reform Act,'75 and it cited numer-
ous cases that had considered and rejected the panel's view of
§ 201(c)(2).'76
One peculiarity of all the Singleton IT opinions is that they
consistently speak of § 201(c)(2) as if it were a sort of exclusionary
rule, applicable, if at all, solely to the conduct of the prosecutor. No
judge faces up squarely to the fact that § 201(c)(2) is a penal stat-
ute. The penalty for violating the provision is not witness preclu-
sion, but a two-year stretch in the penitentiary.' Moreover, if
§ 201(c)(2) applies to a prosecutor who offers to seek a sentence
reduction in return for substantial assistance, then under ordinary
principles of criminal liability, the statute applies equally to the
defense lawyer who conveys the offer and later joins the prosecutor
in urging the court to reduce the client's sentence.'78 Most tell-
ingly, since the power to award a sentence reduction for cooperation
rests in the sole discretion of the court,79 the true malefactor un-
der § 201(c)(2) is neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney,
but the judge who actually "gives" the thing of value. In the end,
the real reason why the Singleton I panel's interpretation of
§ 201(c)(2) is untenable is that it requires one to declare with a
straight face that Congress intended to send federal prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges to prison for colluding to reduce the
sentences of cooperating witnesses.
174. See id. at 1301.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (specifying that the penalty is a fine or imprisonment of
not more than two years, or both).
178. The defense lawyer would be liable either as a conspirator under 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1994), or as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1.
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IV. EXPLAINING THE UNEXPLAINABLE: WHY THESE BAD
OPINIONS ISSUED FROM GOOD JUDGES
A. "Hey, What's That Sound?"
So what's happening here? Are Sealed Case, Solis I, and Single-
ton I inconsequential aberrations, the irrational outbursts of three
isolated panels fortuitously loaded with liberal ideologues? Or, as I
am disposed to think, do these cases, ephemeral though their par-
ticular holdings may prove, represent signs of a deeper and more
sustained current of judicial thought? In the first place, these three
cases cannot be casually dismissed as manifestations of ideological
bias. Of the nine circuit judges who decided Sealed Case, Solis I,
and Singleton I, six were appointed by Presidents Reagan or Bush,
and three were appointed by Presidents Carter and Clinton. 8 ° Of
the eight judges who voted with the majority in these cases, five
were Republican appointees. 8' Of course, the party affiliation of
the President who appointed a judge is hardly an infallible indica-
tor of the ideological disposition of the appointee, but such affilia-
tion is a decent rough proxy. It thus seems fair to conclude that the
three cases considered here were not the product of secret cells of
the ACLU.
Indeed, taken as a group, the nine judges who sat on these
three panels represent a fair cross-section of the federal judiciary -
intelligent, thoughtful, moderate-to-conservative in disposition and
politics. Moreover, these judges were hardly giddy newcomers to the
federal bench. Eight of the nine had been on the appellate bench for
at least six years, and the Sealed Case and Singleton I panels each
boasted the Chief Judge of the circuit. 8 How, then, could this
distinguished group go so palpably astray?
The results in Sealed Case and Solis I may be attributable in
part to an ongoing struggle between the judges, the Justice Depart-
ment, and Congress over control of criminal sentencing. Since the
180. The D.C. Circuit judges who decided Sealed Case were Edwards (Carter), Tatel
(Clinton), and Buckley (Reagan). In the Fifth Circuit, the Solis court consisted of Duhe
(Reagan), Wiener (Bush), and the dissenter Smith (Reagan). The Singleton panel from
the Tenth Circuit was composed of Seymour, C.J. (Carter), Ebel (Reagan), and Kelly
(Bush). See THE AmERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Ruth A. Kennedy et al. eds.,
9th ed. 1997).
181. See id.
182. Of the nine judges, only one, Judge Tatel of the D.C. Circuit, was recently
appointed by President Clinton. See id. at 88. Chief Judge Edwards sat on the Sealed
Case panel, and Chief Judge Seymour was on the Singleton panel. See id. at 67, 83.
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advent of the Guidelines, elements of the federal judiciary have
bemoaned the loss of the courts' former absolute discretion over the
imposition of criminal punishment."s In the wake of Koon, some
lower federal courts have begun testing just how far that opinion
will permit judges to reassert a greater discretionary authority at
sentencing." 4 This process is not limited to cases of substantial
assistance departures, but can be seen in decisions such as United
States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez," where the en banc Ninth Circuit
ignored a plain directive of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
order to permit a sentencing departure based on the sentencing
court's perception of the severity of a prior "aggravating felony." 1
86
Although Sealed Case and Solis I may be ascribable, at least in
significant part, to the broader post-Koon struggle over sentencing
discretion, those two decisions considered together with Singleton I
also suggest a more narrowly focused judicial unease over the feder-
al government's use of informant witnesses. At least three basic
concerns arise in most debates about substantial assistance depar-
tures:
1) "Buying" testimony is wrong because testimony "pur-
chased" with promises of sentencing leniency present too
great a risk of perjury, and thus of wrongful convictions.
2) Even if bargained-for accomplice testimony is sometimes
necessary, federal prosecutors have come to rely on it too
much.
3) The substantial assistance regime, as now applied, gener-
ates a variety of unfair results and, in general, subverts
183. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 707-14, 724-32 (discussing judicial critiques of
the allocation of sentencing discretion under the Guidelines); KATE STITH & JOSE A.
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING (1998) (criticizing the limitation of judicial sentencing
discretion through minimum mandatory sentences and the Guidelines).
184. See generally Paul J. Hofer et al., Departure Rates and Reasons After Koon v.
U.S., 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 284 (1997); Johnson, supra note 94.
185. 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
186. In his persuasive dissent, Judge Trott wrote:
Many sentencing judges will recognize the majority's opinion as welcome relief
from the strictures of the Guidelines and as a restoration to them of much of
the discretion they lost almost fifteen years ago. This case, however, is the
equivalent of a Boston Tea Party, but without the constitutional right or au-
thority to throw it. The majority's holding is contrary to the holding of Koon,
and we trespass on turf that according to the Constitution belongs to Congress
when we make decisions that involve fundamental sentencing policy. As we fell
short in our opinion in Koon, we now go overboard in this one, capsizing the
Guidelines in the process.
Id. at 568-69 (footnote omitted).
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the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines to eliminate unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity. In particular:
a) Substantial assistance departures create the risk that
"kingpins" will receive lower sentences than their
underlings because the "kingpins" have more informa-
tion to exchange for a substantial assistance recom-
mendation.
b) The government motion requirement should be aban-
doned because prosecutors often unfairly refuse to
make substantial assistance motions for defendants
who have indeed assisted the government.
c) There is a wide and unjustifiable disparity between
the practices of U.S. Attorneys in different districts
regarding motions for substantial assistance.
d) In many districts, government motions for substantial
assistance departures subvert the aims of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines by having become merely an-
other plea bargaining tool, often awarded for reasons
unrelated to real assistance to the government.
B. Addressing the Standard Critiques of Substantial
Assistance Departures
1. General Concern #1: "Buying" testimony encourages perjury and
risks wrongful convictions
The fundamental concern of the Singleton I panel was that in-
ducements for testimony offered by either party to a criminal case
encourage perjury and create the risk of a wrongful conviction. 87
In general, the law prohibits purchasing the testimony of fact wit-
nesses with either rewards or threats." It does so because of the
obvious risk that the party who pays the piper will call the tune,
and so corrupt the fact-finding process. The risk of such corruption
seems far greater when the inducement for testimony is not mere
187. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Singleton II, 165 F.3d at
1309 (Kelly, Seymour & Ebel, JJ., dissenting) (characterizing the original panel opinion
as "centering] on maintaining the integrity, fairness, and credibility of our system of
criminal justice").
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). Of course, the law permits parties to pay "expert"
witnesses to give opinion testimony. Whether this difference results from a principled
distinction between the inherent corruptibility of opinion and fact witnesses or simply a
surrender to commercial realties is another question.
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money, but the sorts of incentives only the state, acting through
prosecutors and judges, can offer - the threat of prison for silence,
combined with the promise of freedom (or at least less prison time)
for testimony. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the practice of re-
warding with reduced punishment those who testify for the govern-
ment has an ancient pedigree in the law,'89 and as the en banc
Tenth Circuit reiterated in Singleton II, the practice is firmly en-
trenched in modern statutes and judicial opinions.19 ° Antiquity
alone, however, is a threadbare justification for any legal rule. 9'
Some further exploration of the matter is required.
The true justification for exchanging leniency for cooperation is
a utilitarian argument from necessity - without accomplice infor-
mation and testimony, many serious crimes, particularly complex
crimes involving groups, could not be solved or punished; absent
the prospect of leniency, most, if not all, accomplices would refuse
to cooperate.'92 In Singleton I, for example, the government as-
serted that without the testimony of witnesses who cooperate in
return for lower sentences, it "could not enforce the drug laws,
could not prosecute organized crime figures under RICO, and could
not prosecute many other cases 'of such a character that the only
persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in
the crime.'" '9 As David Sklansky has pointed out, although there
is no empirical proof of the argument from necessity, nonetheless,
the claim that certain kinds of cases cannot be prosecuted without
accomplice testimony has been "conventional wisdom for genera-
tions."'94 Common sense, my own personal experience as a federal
189. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
190. Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1301-02.
191. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.
991, 1001 (1997) (reprinting the publication of an address delivered on January 8, 1897,
which originally appeared in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)).
192. The assertion that courts reward cooperators because cooperation indicates
contrition and a disposition to ameliorate the harm one has done by assisting law
enforcement in apprehending others is true enough so far as it goes, but as a justifica-
tion for substantial assistance sentence reductions it is at best incomplete and at worst
disingenuous.
193. Supplemental Brief of the United States at 15-16, United States v. Singleton,
144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-3178) (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 446 (1972)).
194. David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 FORDHAMi
UR1. L.J. 509, 526 (1999).
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and state prosecutor, and the experience of prosecutorial colleagues
whom I respect 5 dispose me to agree with the conventional wis-
dom, at least to this extent - without accomplice testimony se-
cured through substantial assistance agreements, several important
categories of serious federal crime would be far more difficult to
prosecute, and many individual cases within those categories could
not be prosecuted at all.
The fact that without bargained-for accomplice testimony the
government would not be as successful as it now is in pursuing
some important kinds of cases is a powerful, but not necessarily
dispositive, argument in favor of allowing such testimony. If, as the
Singleton I panel apparently feared, bargained-for testimony from
government witnesses creates an unacceptably high risk of pejury
and thus of wrongful convictions, then the practice should be
banned outright. The most basic difficulty in performing such a
utilitarian calculus is that no one, on either side of the debate, has
any idea how frequently cooperating government witnesses lie, or
what is more to the point, whether they lie more often than any
other type of witness. It is at this point that history reenters the
argument. Although we do not (and probably cannot) know how
often snitches lie, the centuries-long acceptance of rewarding gov-
ernment witnesses rests on a societal consensus, renewed in each
legal generation, that bargaining with thieves and thugs is a neces-
sary, if unsavory, cost of law enforcement. Implicit in the historical
verdict and the plethora of modern law on rewarding cooperators
has been the judgment that the undoubted risk of peijured testimo-
ny is ameliorated to an acceptable degree by the traditional mecha-
nisms of requiring full disclosure of government agreements with
witnesses,"6 and encouraging vigorous adversarial testing of the
cooperating witness's testimony through cross-examination.
One can argue, however, that the traditional judicial accep-
tance of bargained-for testimony reflected in the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Hoffa97 and the congressional codifica-
tion of the same practice in statutes such as the Sentencing Reform
195. For an extraordinarily persuasive explanation by two Assistant United States
Attorneys of the necessity for and power of the substantial assistance motion as a tool
in combatting violent organized crime, see Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Sub.
stantial Assistance Departures: Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon, 12 FED. SENTENCING
REP. (forthcoming 1999).
196. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (requiring gov-
ernment to disclose promises of leniency made to witnesses).
197. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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Act, came before the effects of the Guidelines sentencing regime
began to emerge. In this view, the leverage afforded the govern-
ment through greatly enhanced statutory minimum and Guidelines
sentences, combined with the government monopoly on substantial
assistance motions, creates hitherto unheard-of pressures to cooper-
ate and temptations to lie. Because the post-Guidelines bargaining
power of the prosecutor is undeniably stronger than it was before,
this position has some undoubted force. However, its persuasive-
ness rests on a conflation of two related, but nonetheless quite
distinct, assertions.
First, the incentives to cooperate with the government are now
much stronger and thus more defendants testify, and second, the
enhanced prosecutorial leverage also leads to marked increases in
false testimony. The trouble is that the first consequence - more
accomplice testimony - is a good thing, so long as the testimony is
truthful. Only untruthful accomplice testimony is bad, and there is
no way of knowing that the incidence of such testimony has in-
creased except by assuming that some percentage of cooperating
witnesses will lie and thus, as the percentage of cooperators rises,
the number of cooperating liars will rise as well.
Moreover, the real evil is not false testimony, per se, but the
risk that false "purchased" testimony will produce erroneous convic-
tions. It would be foolish and naive to dismiss the very real possi-
bility that lying informants will sometimes convict the innocent, or
still more commonly, make small fries appear more culpable than
they are. The prisons produce some very plausible liars. On the
other hand, much of the criticism of witness cooperation agree-
ments seems to proceed from the even more naive assumption that
juries consist of credulous bumpkins who automatically convict on
the uncorroborated testimony of a defendant's "flipped" accomplice.
On the contrary, juries are instinctively skeptical of bargained-for
testimony. Even moderately competent cross-examination of such
witnesses makes them more so. As a rule, such testimony helps the
government only where it is woven into a fabric of corroborating de-
tail from untainted sources, and as I can attest from painful per-
sonal experience, a "dirty" witness can actually harm an otherwise
strong case. In short, although accomplice testimony presents unde-
niable risks, there is reason for faith in the law's conventional
mechanisms for testing its veracity.
And yet, even if one finds the need for rewarding some govern-
ment witnesses compelling, and even if one views the panel opinion
in Singleton I as downright eccentric, the source of the panel's
1999]
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unease cannot be entirely ignored or expunged. Faced with the
choice of prison or freedom, witnesses will lie to save themselves,
and sometimes those lies will not be detected by the prosecutor,
exposed by the defense lawyer, or ignored by the jury. No matter
what procedural safeguards are devised for cooperator testimony,
the risk of perjury convicting the innocent can only be minimized it
cannot be eliminated. This ineradicable fact does not require the
abolition or criminalization of witness cooperation agreements. It
does, however, strongly suggest a principle of parsimony in wielding
this uniquely powerful prosecutorial tool. That is, the Department
of Justice should employ cooperation agreements whenever neces-
sary, but not more than necessary, to apprehend and convict serious
violators of federal criminal law. I will suggest some practical mani-
festations of this principle of parsimony later in the Article.
2. General Concern #2: Federal Prosecutors Overuse Informants
and Cooperating Witnesses
Even if one accepts the necessity of sometimes using unsavory
methods in pursuit of laudable ends, it does not necessarily follow
that the law should encourage such methods as common practice. A
number of commentators have decried the post-Guidelines emer-
gence of a "snitch culture" in the federal courts, that is, an ethos in
which the normal means of proving criminal charges is reliance on
bargained-for testimony.' One difficulty in addressing this cri-
tique is that there are no pre-Guidelines statistics on how often
cooperating witnesses had their sentences reduced to compare with
post-Guidelines practice. However, as noted at the outset of this
Article, the number of § 5K1.1 motions filed by federal prosecutors
increased from 3.5% of all cases in 1989 to 19.5% of all federal
prosecutions by 1994.' Between 1994 and 1996, the percentage
of substantial assistance departures remained constant at approxi-
198. The phrase "snitch culture" or an equivalent ': often heard in conversations
among practitioners and academics. The same point is 1.ade in more elevated terms in
published articles. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Making Crime Pay, A.BA. J., June 1991, at
42, 43 (commenting on the rise in the use of confidential informants); Thomas A. Mauet,
Informant Disclosure and Production: A Second Look at Paid Informants, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 563, 563-64 (1995) (arguing in the context of search warrants and arrests that the
use of informants has increased and citing The Police Informant, ANGOLITE, Dec. 1980,
at 25, which argued that informants have become pervasive in the American culture and
the trend is toward their increased use).
199. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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mately 19% of all defendants sentenced."'
What we do not know is the number of cases in which accom-
plice testimony, or the threat of it, resulted in a conviction. One
cannot simply double the 19% of substantial assistance motions to
conclude that 38% of all defendants are either cooperators or the
target of cooperators. Sometimes a defendant will receive a sub-
stantial assistance motion without giving information leading to a
successful prosecution. Sometimes a single cooperating defendant
will testify against many other defendants. Sometimes a number of
co-defendants in a single case will become, successively, the targets
of cooperating witnesses and then cooperating witnesses them-
selves.20' Still, it is probably fair to estimate that somewhere be-
tween thirty and forty percent of all federal criminal defendants ei-
ther cooperate with the government or are prosecuted based at
least in part on information provided by cooperators. Whether the
actual number, whatever it is, is too high, depends largely on one's
beliefs about the incidence of wrongful convictions based on infor-
mant testimony, as well as on the answers to other questions, such
as whether the commonplace use of informant testimony produces
more or "better quality" convictions than would a system in which
such testimony was rare, and whether the government is using
substantial assistance motions to subvert other objectives of the
guidelines regime. Whatever else may be said, the presence of
§ 5K1.1 as a factor in so many cases demonstrates that the Depart-
ment of Justice has so far been little concerned with parsimony in
the use of accomplice testimony.
3. General Concern #3: Substantial Assistance Motions Produce
Various Inequities
Since the adoption of the Guidelines, commentators have raised
a number of complaints about substantial assistance sentence re-
200. See Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An
Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Practice, 11 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 6 (1998). This is a reanalysis of an earlier report prepared by the staff
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Its authors were, at the time of its publication,
Acting Director of the Office of Policy Analysis and the Staff Director of the Commission,
respectively. See id. The conclusions presented in the report are based largely on data
from the much more voluminous unpublished staff report cited supra note 45.
201. I recall one case I prosecuted in the Southern District of Florida in which, by
the time of trial of the principal defendant, seven of the targets co-defendants had pled
guilty and agreed to testify under substantial assistance agreements. See United States
v. Cosgrove, 73 F.3d 297 (11th Cir. 1996).
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ductions which, at bottom, amount to the argument that the sub-
stantial assistance regime, as now arranged, produces inequitable
results."2 I will consider the most common arguments, some of
which are ill-founded and others of which are not.
a. Debunking the "Cooperation Paradox"
One of the most persistent (and most misconceived) criticisms
of substantial assistance departures is the claim that, because so-
called "kingpins" - those higher on the criminal organization chart
- know more facts than their underlings, they will have more
information to give prosecutors and thus will be the beneficiaries of
larger and more frequent sentence reductions. °3 Critics have ex-
pressed particular concern for the plight of the lowest level offend-
ers who know so little that they have no information to bargain
with."4 This phenomenon, so goes the critique, plays havoc with
the fundamental principle of criminal punishment that penalties
should be proportionate to culpability.0 5 More particularly, it is
said to undermine one of the Guidelines's key objectives, that of
reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity."'
Brief elaboration will make the point clearer. The phenomenon
of which the critics complain arises when co-conspirator A, who is
more knowledgeable about and more culpable for the acts of a crim-
inal group than co-conspirator B, cooperates with the authorities
and B does not. Critics find it anomalous that A may receive a
lower sentence than B after the government makes a motion for
202. See, e.g., Hon. Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing
Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027,
1062 (1997) (noting disparity issues with substantial assistance); Christopher M. Alexan-
der, Note, Indeterminate Sentencing: An Analysis of Sentencing in America, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1717, 1729 (1997).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bright, J.,
dissenting). Judge Bright observed:
What kind of a criminal justice system rewards the drug kingpin or near-king-
pin who informs on all the criminal colleagues he or she has recruited, but
sends to prison for years and years the least knowledgeable or culpable con-
spirator, one who knows very little about the conspiracy and is without infor-
mation for the prosecutors?
Id. at 274.
204. See Cynthia IKY. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal
Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 199, 210 (1997).
205. See id.
206. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 199, 212-13 (1993).
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reduction of A's sentence below the otherwise applicable guideline
or statutory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and/or § 5K1.1 of
the Guidelines. The perceived anomaly has been christened the
"cooperation paradox."" '
Despite this argument's superficial appeal, it fails at both a
theoretical and a practical level. From the perspective of a sentenc-
ing theory, any time a criminal receives leniency for informing on
his comrades, there is some compromise of the principle of meting
out punishment among the population of offenders in direct pro-
portion to blameworthiness. The inevitable effect of giving sentenc-
ing credit for assistance to the authorities is to impose lower sen-
tences on cooperators than on similarly situated non-cooperators.
Even if the sentence given the informer is not lower than that of
less culpable co-defendants in his own case, it will certainly be
lower than that imposed on equally or less culpable non-cooperating
defendants in other cases.0 ' After all, this is the point of the pro-
gram. If a cooperating defendant were not offered the prospect of a
lower sentence than he and other similarly situated defendants
otherwise deserved, he would not cooperate. The value of the
§ 5K1.1 motion in investigations of group criminality is to break
group solidarity by offering preferential sentencing treatment to
those who turn on their colleagues. In passing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b),
Congress made the policy choice that the social utility of achieving
convictions through bargained-for testimony outweighed the costs of
207. Id. at 211-12; see also Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing:
Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851,
1858 (1995) (referring to this phenomenon as "inverted sentencing").
208. Professor Gerald Uelmen has argued that proportionality among defendants in
the same case is more important than equality of treatment among similarly situated
defendants in different cases:
My experience [as a prosecutor] suggested that a bank robber in Los Angeles
was less concerned about his sentence being greater than the sentence imposed
on a bank robber in Dallas, than he was about his sentence being greater than
the co-defendant in the same case, who talked him into participating in the
robbery. Disparity is dissipated by distance. Proportionality is most essential
when it is coterminous. The task of apportioning justice based on the relative
culpability of co-defendants in the same case is where the rubber hits the road
in sentencing. That task was generally managed quite well by judges under the
"old system." The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, quite simply, take that task
away from judges and turn it over to prosecutors.
Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 899, 900 (1992). Although the views of co-defendants in the same
case may not be irrelevant, Professor Ueimen does not answer the question of why
society's sentencing choices are necessarily constrained by the opinions of the criminals
being punished.
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deviations from a strictly proportional sentencing system.
The particular outrage expressed by critics over situations in
which the sentence of a "more culpable" cooperator is lower than
that of a "less culpable" non-cooperator is a red herring. The princi-
ple of sentencing in proportion to culpability is no less compromised
when cooperating defendant A receives a lower sentence than
equally culpable, non-cooperating co-defendant B, than it is if A's
sentence is lower than non-cooperating co-defendant C, whose cul-
pability is 10% (or 1%) less than A's and B's. Moreover, in order to
preserve strict proportionality of sentencing among co-defendants,
the maximum sentencing concession available to any cooperator
would have to be limited by the purely arbitrary factor of the sen-
tence of the next-most-culpable co-defendant. For example, a coop-
erating defendant could receive a ten-month reduction in sentence
if the next-most-culpable defendant in his case received a sentence
ten months lower than the cooperator's guideline range. A coopera-
tor in a different case who was identically situated, except that
there happened to be no less culpable co-defendants in the case,
would have no downward limit on the sentence reduction a judge
might award. A cooperation system structured in this way would be
both practically ineffective (because it would frequently preclude
offering meaningful incentives to those with valuable information to
impart) and facially unjust (because sentence reductions for cooper-
ation would be subject to arbitrary limitations having no relation-
ship to the value of the cooperation provided).
In short, in most cases the "cooperation paradox" is no paradox
at all, merely a pejorative catchphrase for the way any system of
rewarding accomplice testimony always works - criminals who in-
form on their compatriots sometimes get lower sentences than
equally guilty or less guilty criminals who do not. But what about
the extreme cases? What about those "kingpins" who skate for rat-
ting on their underlings, or the poor ignorant couriers and other
schmoes doing long sentences while the big guys betray them and
go free? In situations like that, hasn't the sentencing system aban-
doned its most basic premises? Well, yes, if there were any evidence
that such miscarriages of justice happened with any frequency, it
would certainly be a powerful argument in the arsenal of the critics
of substantial assistance departures. However, there is no such
evidence. The originator of the phrase "cooperation paradox," Pro-
fessor Stephen Schulhofer, was careful to state that the Guidelines
have the potential to penalize underlings far more harshly than
kingpins, without actually asserting that this penalizing actually
[Vol. XXIX
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often occurs." 9 Most commentators, on the other hand, have not
been so circumspect. They assert as a fact that leaders often receive
much lower sentences than followers, but they never cite evidence
to support the claim.21
209. Professor Schulhofer wrote:
Defendants who are most in the know, and thus have the most "substantial
assistance" to offer, are often those who are most centrally involved in conspir-
atorial crimes. The highly culpable offender may be the best placed to negotiate
a big sentencing break. Minor players, peripherally involved and with little
knowledge or responsibility, have little to offer and thus can wind up with far
more severe sentences than the boss.... Instead of a pyramid of liability
with long sentences for leaders at the top of the organizational ladder, the
mandatory system can become an inverted pyramid with stiff sentences for
minor players and modest punishments for knowledgeable insiders who can cut
favorable deals.
Schulhofer, supra note 206, at 212-13 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
210. See, e.g., Judy Clarke, The Sentencing Guidelines: What a Mess, FED. PROBA-
TION 45 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Un-
acceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Thomas W.
Hillier, 11, The Sentencing Commission and Its Critics, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 224
(1990); Lee, supra note 204; William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 339 (1991) (claiming, without evidence, that "the [drug] dealer is
often able to negotiate with the prosecutor for a sentence below the minimum in return
for cooperation which the small fry is unable to offer").
In her article, Ms. Clarke states, "Disparity increases substantially in drug cases
where often the 'heavy' is able to offer cooperation and the lesser involved defendants
are not able to assist." Clarke, supra, at 46. Ms. Clarke, however, offers no evidence ei-
ther that (a) more culpable defendants "often" cooperate when less culpable ones do not,
or (b) the less culpable defendant often receives a greater sentence than the 'heavy."
Professor Freed states:
The application of the "substantial assistance" adjustment in drug courier cases,
for example, results in serious imbalances by producing unduly severe sentences
for "mules" who know little about the drug syndicates for which they work and
unduly lenient sentences for substantial drug dealers who tell all after their
arrest by DEA agents.
Freed, supra, at 1705. For many years, Professor Freed has been one of America's most
knowledgeable and astute observers of the Guidelines, but here he links one debatable
assumption with a factual premise unsupported by evidence. First, he assumes drug
couriers "know little" about the organizations for which they work, when in fact they
often know a great deal, and would not be employed unless they enjoyed the confidence
of the "substantial drug dealers" for whom they work. Second, the claim that substantial
drug dealers often receive lower sentences than couriers is unsupported by evidence. He
cites United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), in which the
court constructs a hypothetical case of disproportionate sentencing that does not even
involved substantial assistance departures. And he cites two articles, Catherine M.
Goodwin, Sentencing Narcotics Cases Where Drug Amount Is a Poor Indication of Rela-
tive Culpability, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 226 (1992), and Deborah Young, Rethinking the
Commission's Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 93 (1990), neither of which provides either data nor anecdote to
prove that "substantial drug dealers" get lower sentences than the couriers who work for
them. See Freed, supra, at 1754 nn.132-33.
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The lack of published evidence demonstrating that severe cases
of "cooperation paradox" are common is hardly surprising, because
there is every reason to doubt that the phenomenon in any very
extreme form happens much at all. The critics' conviction that it
happens all the time ignores the internal logic of complex investiga-
tions, particularly narcotics investigations - catch the small fish
first, precisely because they are the ones handling the drugs in the
transactions with undercover agents, and then use cooperation
agreements to turn them against the people they work for. One
cannot simply start at the top and work down, because one needs
the people at the bottom to get to the top.
The critics' faith in the ubiquity of the "cooperation paradox"
also flies in the face of normal expectations of rational prosecutorial
and judicial behavior. The critics' position necessarily assumes that
prosecutors routinely choose to convict minnows by giving away the
sentencing store to the whales, that the dream of every prosecutor's
life is to make a sweetheart deal with Al Capone so Al can testify
against his bookkeeper and the corner distiller of bathtub gin. It
also assumes sentencing judges are so obtuse that they cannot
recognize a case in which a large sentence reduction to one cooper-
ating defendant badly skews the proportionality of punishment
between all the defendants, as well as being so incompetent that,
having recognized the potential disparity, they are powerless to
prevent it. Despite the fact that prosecutors have a monopoly on
Mr. Hillier asserts that 'dozens of high level drug dealers are receiving more le-
nient sentences (at least comparatively) than their less culpable confederates because
they have more to offer the government by way of information."). Hillier, supra, at 224.
Mr. Hillier offers no proof that even "dozens" of "high level drug dealers" are getting
disproportionately low sentences, and he provides no explanation of his interesting paren-
thetical qualification - "at least comparatively."
Professor Lee asserts:
The cooperation paradox is particularly acute in drug conspiracy cases where
co-conspirators at the bottom of the hierarchy have little or no information to
share with the government and the ones at the top have information and thus
are able to receive the benefit of a substantial assistance departure. In such
cases, the least culpable co-conspirators often end up with harsher sentences
than the more culpable co-conspirators.
Lee, supra note 204, at 210 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). Professor Lee's
authorities for this factual claim are the dissenting opinion in United States v. Griffin,
17 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bright, J., dissenting), which itself cites no data, and a
law review article, Antoinette Marie Tease, Downward Departures for Substantial Assis-
tance: A Proposal for Reducing Sentencing Disparities Among Codefendants, 53 MONT. L.
REV. 75, 75 (1992), which also makes the same claim without data. See Lee, supra note
204, at 251 n.50.
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the power to request substantial assistance reductions (except, at
least for the moment, in the D.C. Circuit), judges retain absolute
discretion to grant or deny such motions and equally absolute dis-
cretion concerning the amount of any resulting departure. Only a
remarkably inept jurist cannot maintain rough proportionality
within a single case if he or she considers it important to do so.
Such statistical evidence as exists lends support to the impres-
sion that the "cooperation paradox" is not much of a real world
problem. As part of a study of substantial assistance departures
published in 1997, the staff of the Sentencing Commission analyzed
sixty-four conspiracies in which at least one defendant received a
substantial assistance motion.21' In the drug conspiracies, "partici-
pants whose predominant function was passive (e.g., enabler or
renter/storer) received substantial assistance reductions at signifi-
cantly higher rates than other participants," while "high-level deal-
ers or leaders of significant drug organizations and street-level
dealers (selling to users) were the least likely to receive the reduc-
tion."212 The Commission staff also saw indications that the gov-
ernment in effect reduced the threshold standard of "substantial
assistance" in order to allow "low-level players" the benefit of a sub-
stantial assistance motion.213 In non-drug conspiracies, "mid-level"
defendants received substantial assistance departures at a higher
rate than other groups.214 The study suggests that in all types of
conspiracies, low-level offenders benefitted from a variety of factors
in addition to, or in place of, substantial assistance motions which
kept their sentences lower relative to other more-culpable co-defen-
dants.2 15
b. In Defense of the Government Motion Requirement
The requirement of a government motion as a prerequisite for a
substantial assistance departure may have been the subject of more
academic abuse than any other procedural feature of the Sentenc-
211. See FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES, supra note 45, at 75.
212. Id. at 86.
213. Id. at 86, 89.
214. See id. at 89.
215. These considerations included having lower minimum mandatory sentences than
other members of the conspiracy or no mandatory minimum sentence at all; being con-
victed of an offense with a lower statutory maximum sentence than other members of
the conspiracy and receiving a downward departure for some reason other than sub-
stantial assistance. See id. at 89-93.
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ing Guidelines."' Calls for its abolition have been raining down
for more than a decade, but Congress, the Commission (and the Su-
preme Court) have stuck to their guns, and the rule remains. It
should. Congress and the Commission got it right in the first place.
The critics are wrong.
The primary criticisms of the government motion requirement
are that it gives the government too much power, that it deprives
sentencing courts of authority properly theirs, and that it risks
unfairness because prosecutors may refuse to make the motion for
defendants whose assistance really has been substantial. One of the
principle flaws in the critics' position flows from a miscategorization
of the substantial assistance mechanism as merely another of the
myriad Guidelines rules whose function is to control unwarranted
sentencing disparity." Section 3553(e) of Title 18 and § 5K1.1 of
the Guidelines are not rules about sentencing equity. They are
grants of power to prosecutors to perform a difficult and sometimes
unappetizing task - coercing criminals to do a doubly unpleasant
thing: admit their own guilt, and then violate a basic human taboo
by informing on their friends, associates, or even blood relatives.
"Turning" accomplices into witnesses is rough business. Fair argu-
ments can be made that as a society we ought not do it at all. How-
ever, if we are to do it, then the rules governing the process must
ensure that society gets the benefit of its bargain in the form of full,
complete, truthful information and testimony.
Cooperating witnesses do not like either to give incriminating
information about or to testify against their friends. Overcoming
their initial resistance to helping the government at all takes im-
mense leverage. The Guidelines and statutory minimum mandatory
216. See, e.g., Avern Cohn, The Unfairness of 'Substantial Assistance,' 78 JUDICATURE
186 (1995); Cynthia KLY. Lee, The Sentencing Court's Discretion to Depart Downward in
Recognition of a Defendant's Substantial Assistance: A Proposal to Eliminate the Govern-
ment Motion Requirement, 23 IND. L. REV. 681 (1990); Lee, supra note 204; Tease, supra
note 210; Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial Assistance
Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement: Enforcing A Good Faith Standard, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1253, 1272-75 (1994); Kimberly S. Kelley, Comment, Substantial Assistance Under
the Guidelines: How Smitherman Transfers Sentencing Discretion from Judges to Prose-
cutors, 76 IOWA L. REV. 187 (1990); Philip T. Masterson, Comment, Eliminating the
Government Motion Requirement of Section 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines -
A Substantial Response to Substantial Assistance: United States v. Gutierrez, 24
CREIGHTON L. REv. 929 (1991).
217. This misapprehension is evident even among the staff of the Sentencing Com-
mission itself as the introductory passages of the Maxfield and Kramer substantial assis-
tance report reveal. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 200, at 1-5.
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sentences provide the initial leverage by creating a level of certain-
ty about the unpleasant consequences of conviction that never exist-
ed in the pre-Guidelines indeterminate sentencing system. It is one
thing to be facing a sentence that could range anywhere from pro-
bation to forty years depending on the whim of the judge. It is an-
other thing altogether to have your lawyer sit you down in front of
a chart that says you will be sentenced to 121-151 months unless a
ground for departure can be found. Before the Guidelines, it was
psychologically easy to gamble on the sentencing judge's generosity.
Now defendants reach much faster for the only escape hatch, an
agreement to cooperate with the government.
Nevertheless, even after defendants cross the first hurdle of
agreeing to cooperate, they would still prefer, naturally enough, to
give as little information as possible, to conceal facts that show
themselves in a discreditable light, and to do as little damage to
their former friends as they can. The severity and certainty of
Guidelines sentences provide the initial impetus for witness cooper-
ation, but it is the government monopoly on the substantial assis-
tance motion that ensures candor, completeness, and continued
cooperation until the job is done. In a system where the sentencing
judge can act at the defendant's request and over the objection of
the government, even partial, grudging cooperation stands a fair
chance of earning at least some sentence reduction. Judges since
Solomon and before have always been baby splitters - they in-
stinctively want to give each party, if not half, then at least some
portion of the object of contention. Moreover, for a judge with a
crowded docket, splitting the baby is far more economical than
investing the time and mental energy that would be necessary to
fully understand the government's case, the allegedly cooperative
defendant's place in it, and the inevitably intricate arguments
about why the defendant was or was not truthful or completely
forthcoming in some particular respect.
Finally, given that sentencing levels under the Guidelines are
indeed quite substantial, judges have plenty of leeway to grant
some sentence reduction for disputed or half-hearted cooperation
without completely foregoing punishment. By contrast, under the
current system, unless the prosecutor, who knows the case better
than anyone and has both the knowledge and incentive to detect
lies, half-truths, and incomplete disclosure, is satisfied that defen-
dant is truthful and completely forthcoming, no motion will be filed
and no reduction is possible. Thus, under a substantial assistance
system in which the prosecutor is stripped of the doorkeeper func-
1999]
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tion, the incentive to cooperate some would remain, but the impera-
tive of complete and candid cooperation would be dramatically di-
minished.
The Fifth Circuit's original opinion in Solis illustrates the point
nicely. Defendant Solis spoke with government agents four times,
but never testified, never worked in an undercover capacity, and
never provided any information of practical consequence."' None-
theless, the court of appeals, without any factual inquiry whatever,
declared, in effect, "Aw, that's good enough," and granted a sen-
tence reduction.21 Without the government motion requirement,
there is reason to fear that such judicial behavior would become
common.
The complaint that the government motion requirement im-
properly deprives judges of sentencing authority is also miscon-
ceived. It tends to glide over the fact that, once the government
makes its motion, the district court has essentially unlimited dis-
cretion either to grant or deny it,22° and unlimited discretion as to
the amount of any resulting departure.2 ' The critics would cer-
tainly respond that the motion requirement deprives the court of
power to redress the injustice that results when the government
refuses to seek a substantial assistance departure for a defendant
whose efforts on the government's behalf entitle him to a reduction.
There are two answers to this critique. First, as discussed
above, judges are ill-suited for making the determination of wheth-
er a defendant provided genuine, and substantial, assistance to the
government. The best judge of whether a defendant has been of
substantial assistance to the government is the government itself.
Second, and more importantly, common sense (buttressed by some
statistical evidence 2 ) demonstrate that the risk of prosecutors
frequently refusing to seek sentence reductions for those who genu-
218. See Solis I, 161 F.3d at 283.
219. See id. at 285.
220. See United States v. Franks, 46 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that a
district court need not depart simply due to government motion); United States v.
Eibler, 991 F.2d 1350, 1355 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that appellate court has no jurisdic-
tion to review district court's refusal to depart "when the refusal reflects an exercise of
the judge's discretion"); United States v. Graham, 946 F.2d 19, 22 (4th Cir. 1991) (recog-
nizing when a district court exercises discretion not to depart downward, the decision is
unreviewable). See generally HAINES, WOLL & BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 783.
221. See United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897, 898 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the
court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review extent of substantial assistance departure).
See generally HAINES, WOLL & BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 784.
222. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
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inely cooperate is vanishingly small.
In the first place, the claim that prosecutors would behave this
way ignores the powerful systemic incentives that favor reliably
rewarding witness cooperation. Understanding this reality requires
an appreciation of some of the subtleties of substantial assistance
negotiations. The relationship between witness and prosecutor does
not begin with an exchange of unconditional promises. At her first
meeting with a potential cooperator, the AUSA does not say, "If you
talk to me today, I promise to move to reduce your sentence." In-
stead, the prosecutor says, "Start talking today. Today, and all the
other times we will meet, tell me everything you know. Testify
truthfully at trial. Once you have done all those things, I will evalu-
ate your performance, and if, in my sole discretion, I conclude that
you have provided substantial assistance, then I will move to reduce
your sentence. Trust me."' From the government's perspective,
this one-sided arrangement is absolutely necessary to ensure com-
plete cooperation until the end of the case. From the defendant's
perspective, it makes no sense to accept such a lopsided deal unless
your lawyer tells you that you can trust the prosecutor to do the
right thing.
If a prosecutor uses a cooperating defendant in any significant
way, and then refuses without powerful justification to make a
substantial assistance motion, she risks lasting damage to her cred-
ibility that will markedly impair her capacity to turn other defen-
dants in future cases. The federal criminal bar, even in very large
cities, is a limited and insular fraternity. Word gets around. All
experienced federal criminal lawyers understand this reality."4
In addition, when evaluating the claim that prosecutors com-
monly withhold "deserved" substantial assistance motions, one
must remember one fact of prosecutorial life that has remained
constant before and after the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines
- the ever-present need to manage caseloads by securing guilty
pleas in the vast majority of indicted cases." 5 The substantial as-
223. In essence, this was the agreement the government made with the defendant in
Singleton. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1344.
224. After reviewing a draft of this Article, Professor Steven Clymer, who is also an
experienced federal prosecutor, wrote the Author,
When I was [an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles], I would give defense
attorneys "references" - the names of other attorneys whose clients had coop-
erated and for whom I had made 5K motions, so that they could determine for
themselves whether I would treat their clients fairly if they chose to cooperate.
E-mail from Steven Clymer to Frank Bowman (May 9, 1999) (on file with Author).
225. More than 90% of all federal criminal cases are disposed of by guilty plea. See,
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sistance motion is not only a useful tool for its intended purpose of
obtaining necessary testimony from reluctant accomplices, it is also
a marvelous method of securing a guilty plea from the cooperator
himself. Thus, the persistent temptation for prosecutors is not to
withhold § 5K1.1 motions from the deserving, but to distribute
them liberally in order to facilitate easy guilty pleas.22
Finally, the sheer plenitude of substantial assistance depar-
tures is a powerful refutation of contention that AUSAs are unfairly
parsimonious in rewarding cooperators. As noted above, roughly
one-fifth of all federal defendants nationwide are the beneficiaries
of substantial assistance motions. 7 If the national average were
not high enough, statistics gathered by the Sentencing Commission
show that some U.S. Attorneys' Offices dispense substantial assis-
tance motions at startlingly high rates. The most striking example
is the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where, during fiscal year
1996, substantial assistance motions were made by the government
on behalf of 47.5% of the defendants sentenced.2" When the sta-
tistical evidence suggests that substantial assistance departures
are, if anything, over-recommended by federal prosecutors, the
solution is hardly to abandon the government motion requirement
and give carte blanche to courts to hand out even more such depar-
tures.
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, at 56 tbl.17 (showing that 91.9%
of all federal convictions during fiscal year 1995 were obtained by guilty plea).
226. The impetus to use § 5K1.1 to secure pleas from cooperators also stems from
what I perceive to be a common psychological truth about prosecutors. In my experience,
prosecutors tend to measure their success by convictions, not by the length of sentences
obtained. For example, I know almost exactly how many trials I won and how many
trials I lost in 14 years as a prosecutor. In my complex federal investigations, I remem-
ber distinctly the defendants who pleaded guilty and those who went to trial. However,
I have virtually no memory of the sentences imposed in any of my cases. For me, and I
think for many of my colleagues, a "win" was a conviction followed by some prison time,
a "loss" was an acquittal. It was not that the length of sentence did not matter, it was
simply that the fact of conviction was of more importance than the particulars of the
sentence. With this mindset, prosecutors can find it very easy to rationalize exchanging
a sentencing concession, even a concession not permitted by the letter of the Guidelines,
for the certainty of a guilty plea.
227. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
228. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B.
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c. The Department of Justice Has Failed to Regulate the Use of
Substantial Assistance Motions by Government Lawyers
Sentencing Commission statistics establish two undeniable
facts. First, there are quite astonishing differences among U.S.
Attorney's Offices in the rates at which they make substantial as-
sistance motions. In contrast to the 47.5% rate in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of
Virginia and the Central District of California make such motions
in only 7.2 and 6.9 percent of their cases respectively. 29 Although
not quite as stark as the inter-district disparities, there are also
marked regional differences in substantial assistance departure
rates among federal circuits. In FY 1998, the rate varied from a low
of 11.3% in the Ninth Circuit to a high of 31.5% in the Third Cir-
cuit (home of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania). ° Second, the
very high substantial assistance departure rates in districts like the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania are plainly inconsistent with both
the text and spirit of § 5K1.1, and cannot be explained by reference
to the conventional justification for the substantial assistance de-
vice. It simply strains credulity to suggest that half the federal
defendants in Philadelphia provide genuinely "substantial" help to
the government, or that Philadelphia prosecutors need to offer
substantial assistance departures to half the people indicted in the
district in order to secure an acceptable rate of convictions. When
cooperation departures are dispensed in nearly half of all cases, the
substantial assistance motion has ceased to be a closely guarded
method of obtaining needed evidence, and has degenerated into a
convenient caseload reduction tool. Both wide variations in § 5K1.1
motion rates between judicial districts and high absolute numbers
of § 5K1.1 motions in particular districts are bad in themselves,
and foolish for the Department of Justice.
i. Inter-District Disparities
Persistent inter-district disparities in departure motion rates
give powerful ammunition to critics of the government monopoly on
229. See id.
230. U.S. SENTENCING COAMI'N, 1998 Data File, USSCFY98. The substantial assis-
tance departure figures for the other circuits were: D.C. Circuit: 17.9%; First Circuit:
21.5%; Second Circuit: 23.9%; Fourth Circuit: 21.3%; Fifth Circuit: 16.9%; Sixth Circuit:
27.1%; Seventh Circuit: 20.6%; Eighth Circuit: 22.9%; Tenth Circuit: 14.4%; Eleventh
Circuit: 22.0%. Id.
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the substantial assistance motion. As demonstrated above, the
government motion requirement is essential to securing full, truth-
ful, and sustained cooperation from the witnesses who prosecutors
really need to prove their casesY1 But inter-district disparities of
the magnitude which now exist allow critics to argue that
prosecutors in districts with relatively high rates are behaving
"fairly," while those in districts with low rates are being unjust.
Alternatively, such disparities permit critics to argue (without char-
acterizing either high or low departure rates as correct) that the
government is being unfair because it is applying different stan-
dards to similarly situated defendants based purely on the fortuity
of geographical location. In either case, say the critics, judicial in-
tervention is required to ensure equity. 2 The government is poor-
ly situated to meet such arguments because it cannot admit the
truth - prosecutors in districts which routinely use § 5K1.1 mo-
tions as case management tools are recommending § 5K1.1 sen-
tence reductions for a multitude of defendants who do not deserve
them, often in cases in which accomplice testimony is not necessary
to secure convictions.'
The government might defend its heterogenous § 5K1.1 practic-
es by pointing to a surprising recent finding by Professor Ian
Weinstein. His analysis of Sentencing Commission data revealed
that, remarkably, there appears to be no statistically significant
correlation between the rate of substantial assistance departures
and the average length of sentences imposed in a district.' At
first blush, this result seems to belie the claim that inter-district
disparities in substantial assistance motion rates produce disparate
sentencing patterns for similarly situated defendants in different
districts. However, on close examination, Professor Weinstein's
conclusions provide little solace to the Justice Department.
In the first place, Professor Weinstein's analysis does not show
that the rate of substantial assistance departures in a district has
no effect on overall sentence lengths in that district. Nor does he
dispute the commonsense proposition that the difference in overall
231. See supra Part IV.B.3.b.
232. See, e.g., Alan J. Chaset, Koon Opens Another Door: District of Columbia
Circuit Permits § 5K1.1 Departure Without Government Motion, 22 CHAMPION, Dec. 1998,
at 26, 28.
233. With, one might add, the active collusion of the judges in their districts.
234. Ian Weinstein, Substantial Assistance and Sentence Severity: Is There a Correla-
tion?, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 83 (1998).
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sentence lengths between two judicial districts may sometimes be
attributable to differences between the districts in rate of substan-
tial assistance departuresY5 Defendants in District A may very
well receive different sentences than identically situated defendants
in District B because of differing local substantial assistance prac-
tices. Considered carefully, Professor Weinstein's study shows only
that, when all ninety-three judicial districts are considered in the
aggregate, the effect of substantial assistance departure rates on
average sentence length is unpredictable.
Professor Weinstein's explanation for his counterintuitive find-
ings is that the § 5K1.1 departure is only one of a variety of means
available to prosecutors and judges to manipulate sentence lengths,
and that different districts have evolved different patterns of em-
ploying the available tools. For example, both Weinstein and Pro-
fessor Lisa Farabee have found an inverse relationship between the
number of substantial assistance departures and the number of
non-5K1.1 judicial departures in a district or region; the more sub-
stantial assistance departures, the fewer judicial departures, and
vice versa. 6 Other prosecutorial means of massaging sentencing
outcomes include charging decisions and sentence factor manipu-
lation." '
If Weinstein's explanation of his results is correct (and based
on my own experience and conversations with federal prosecutors
around the country, I am disposed to think he is), then his survey
does not disprove the charge that differing substantial assistance
motion rates produce disparity. Instead, it may lend credence to an
even more profound criticism of prosecutorial sentencing behavior,
namely that prosecutors are not merely inconsistent in exercising
the discretion concededly given them by the Guidelines to make or
not make substantial assistance motions, but they are seizing con-
trol of the entire sentencing process by sub rosa manipulations of a
variety of other sentencing mechanisms. This interpretation of
Weinstein's data would oversimplify a complex picture. The local
235. See, e.g., Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569 (1998) (describing a statistical
comparison of departure rates in the Districts of Massachusetts and Connecticut that
shows some correlation between a higher substantial assistance rate and lower average
sentences in Massachusetts).
236. Farabee, supra note 235, at 629; Weinstein, supra note 234, at 84.
237. For discussion of sentence factor manipulation, see Frank 0. Bowman, I, To
Tell the Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial "Manipulation" of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 324 (1996).
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sentencing equilibria Weinstein describes are plainly the result of
interactions between all the institutional actors in the sentencing
system- judges, defense attorneys, probation officers, and prosecu-
tors. Nonetheless, if Weinstein's survey does not prove the common
claim that prosecutors dominate federal sentencing, it certainly
suggests that prosecutors are exercising discretion in a number of
ways that circumvent the design of the Sentencing Guidelines.
ii. Excessive Overall Departure Rates
Even if large inter-district disparities in substantial assistance
motion rates did not exist, excessive substantial assistance depar-
ture rates, such as those in Philadelphia, which are far higher than
can possibly be justified by any genuine need to obtain accomplice
testimony, would lend force to the allegation that the government is
routinely manipulating the Guidelines to achieve the sentencing
outcomes it desires rather than those that would be produced by
neutral application of Guidelines rules. When the Government acts
this way, it cheats on the implicit contract that supports the entire
Guidelines structure. The Guidelines were designed to reduce sen-
tencing disparity by constraining judicial discretion. The Guidelines
are supposed to prevent judges from imposing their personally or
regionally idiosyncratic visions of justice in place of nationally de-
termined norms. In the course of constraining judicial discretion,
the authors of the Guidelines undeniably increased the influence of
prosecutors over sentencing by making the Guidelines fact-driven.
Under the Guidelines, facts like drug quantities, fraud loss
amounts, the use of a weapon, and the like have necessary sentenc-
ing consequences; in such a system, prosecutors have great influ-
ence because they are in command of the facts. However, one of the
most critical, if unstated, premises of the Guidelines system is that,
if it is to work, prosecutors must act as honest stewards - prose-
cuting cases vigorously, presenting all relevant facts to the sentenc-
ing judge, and letting the sentencing chips fall where they may.
The Guidelines cannot survive in anything like their present
form if the government insists that judges be restrained, but refus-
es to accept limitations on its own power to set sentencing out-
comes. If the government systematically evades the Guidelines's
limitations on prosecutorial sentencing authority, then the Guide-
lines really do become merely an excuse for raising sentences across
the board with no pretension of reducing sentencing disparity. If
that becomes either the truth or the widespread perception of the
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Guidelines, then Congress will in time give the judges back much of
their old unfettered discretion. Or, as evidenced by cases like
Sealed Case and Solis I, the judges will take it back, and Congress
and the Sentencing Commission will be so disillusioned that they
will lack the incentive to pass corrective laws or guidelines to re-
peal the judicial incursions.
The Guidelines's many critics in the defense community would,
of course, applaud their collapse. But for the Department of Justice
to contribute to such an outcome would be unbelievably shortsight-
ed. The Guidelines are good for the government. They ensure that
those who commit serious federal crimes do serious federal time.
Neutrally applied, they promote fair outcomes. And they give the
government a uniquely powerful tool - the substantial assistance
motion - for combating group criminality. It would be a sad irony
if the government's overuse of § 5K1.1 contributed to the loss of
both the tool and the Guidelines system itself.
V. SOME PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ACTION
If the Department of Justice is to forestall the imposition of
disadvantageous and substantively undesirable changes to the
present substantial assistance regime, and perhaps to the Guideline
system as a whole, it must act promptly and decisively.
First, policy makers in the Justice Department must focus their
attention on the Sentencing Guidelines in general and substantial
assistance in particular. In my view, federal prosecutors across the
country too often exhibit a distressing complacency about the
Guidelines. It is as if this system, so profoundly helpful to the en-
terprise of criminal law enforcement, were an immutable feature of
the natural environment, impervious to time and tide. Nothing
could be further from the truth. The advantages conferred upon
prosecutors by the Guidelines have been under attack since their
inception. The cases discussed in this Article, Singleton and Sealed
Case, as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Koon increasing
judicial departure authority, are but a few among an increasing
number of signs that the tide may be turning, that there is an
emerging consensus among influential elements of the bench, the
bar, and Congress in favor of restraining federal prosecutorial
powerY8 One of the forms such restraint might take in the sen-
238. Another example is the recent passage of the McDade bill, which was enacted
as a provision in the Citizens Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801, 112
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tencing arena would be externally-imposed limitations on prose-
cutors' ability to bargain for and reward witness cooperation." 9
Second, the Justice Department must insist that federal prose-
cutors abide by both the letter and spirit of the Guidelines. In par-
ticular, the Department must insist that prosecutors file substan-
tial assistance motions only when the recipient really did provide
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person. It should impose this discipline, not merely because contin-
ued indiscipline invites intrusions on prosecutorial prerogatives, but
for a far more important reason as well. The mission of the Depart-
ment is to do justice. Whatever else doing justice may mean, it
requires that those who enforce the law abide by the law. If the law
is wrong, the role of the Justice Department is not to ignore it,
evade it, or exploit it, but to expose the problem and advocate cor-
rections. The evidence is quite clear that federal prosecutors in a
great many places are misusing substantial assistance departures
to manipulate sentencing outcomes in contravention of both the
letter and spirit of the Guidelines. That is wrong and the Depart-
ment of Justice should not condone it.
I hasten to add that I do not ascribe malign motives to individ-
ual prosecutors who use substantial assistance motions for purpos-
es other than obtaining badly needed evidence against an accom-
plice. Such prosecutors would undoubtedly respond, in utter good
faith, that their objective is precisely to attain what they perceive
to be justice in the particular case. The point is that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines embody a societal judgment that justice in
sentencing is not a product of the personal standard of any one
decision-maker, but of the application of uniform, nationwide stan-
dards to all similarly situated defendants. The job of the Depart-
ment of Justice is to implement that societal judgment. If the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines are wholly unjust, the Department
should urge their repeal. If portions of the Guidelines are intolera-
bly harsh or impose too many restraints on prosecutorial discretion,
the Department should propose corrective amendments. What the
Department may not properly do is insist that everyone else abide
by the Guidelines while condoning Guidelines evasion by its own
Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1999)).
239. As but one example, the 1998 Sentencing Commission staff report on substan-
tial assistance concludes that the Commission should "provide guidance" regarding the
magnitude of substantial assistance departures. Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 200, at
15.
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people.
Third, the Department should act to reduce as far as possible
the dramatic existing disparities between the substantial assistance
practices of different U.S. Attorneys' Offices. Absolute uniformity
among all ninety-three districts is neither possible or desirable.
Different districts have different demographics, different caseloads,
different personalities, and different problems. There must be room
in any Department policy to accommodate variations in local condi-
tions and methods. Therefore, I do not suggest that Main Justice
set district quotas or numerical targets for substantial assistance
motions. However, the Department should adopt, after careful con-
sideration and with extensive participation by U.S. Attorneys and
line prosecutors from around the country, a set of non-binding in-
ternal guidelines regarding substantial assistance motions. The
United States Attorney's Manual presently requires that substantial
assistance motions be approved by a supervisory attorney and that
"documentation of the facts" behind each motion be maintained, but
no national standards exist on what constitutes substantial assis-
tance. ° The Sentencing Commission's staff report found that four
out of five U.S. Attorneys' offices have a written substantial assis-
tance policy,"' and 100% of the offices surveyed had some review
or approval procedure for substantial assistance motions. 2 None-
theless, the report also concluded that a significant disparity exist-
ed between U.S. Attorneys' offices regarding the factors relevant to
the decision about whether substantial assistance actually occur-
red. 3 This result is consistent with the phenomenon already not-
ed of widely differing substantial assistance rates between dis-
tricts.4
The process of drafting internal guidelines should be preceded
by a careful internal study of current practice with a view to identi-
fying the factors that should be determinative of whether a motion
should be made. Once internal guidelines are in place, the Attorney
General should require that no substantial assistance motion be
made without prior approval by a standing committee within each
U.S. Attorney's Office or Criminal Division Section which would
240. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL ch. 9, § 27.400
(1997).
241. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 200, at 9.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 7, 9.
244. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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review the case in light of the internal guidelines. Finally, the As-
sistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, or his designate
(possibly the person tasked to serve as the Justice Department's Ex
Officio member of the Sentencing Commission), should set up a
system for monitoring U.S. Attorney compliance with the substan-
tial assistance review process.
No conceivable set of non-binding guidelines could achieve
absolute national uniformity, and the political forces within the
Department would no doubt ensure that any internal guidelines
were general in character with a fair degree of wiggle room. Thus,
outside critics might consider the effort a toothless charade. I am
confident, however, that well-crafted internal guidelines combined
with local review and Main Justice monitoring would markedly
regularize substantial assistance practice across the country, with-
out at the same time eliminating room for healthy regional varia-
tion and the sound exercise of the individual prosecutor's discretion.
Fourth, when drafting its substantial assistance guidelines and
when considering other policies (such as grants of immunity) relat-
ing to bargained-for testimony, the Department should adopt a
general principle of parsimony. By "principle of parsimony" I do not
mean merely a fancy name for a rule that prosecutors should seek
substantial assistance departures only for those who truly assisted
the government. Rather, the Department should view all reductions
of punishment for cooperation in their proper light, that is, as nec-
essary, but undesirable, deviations from the general principle that
the punishment should fit the crime, which, moreover, pose espe-
cially high risks of perjury and conviction of the innocent. Conse-
quently, the Department of Justice should encourage its prosecutors
to employ cooperation agreements whenever necessary, but not
more than necessary, to apprehend and convict serious violators of
federal criminal law.
VT CONCLUSION
The substantial assistance motion is the most powerful prose-
cutorial tool in modern federal criminal law. Unlike many academic
observers, I think much of the criticism of the substantial assis-
tance mechanism is misplaced. However, like all instruments of
power, the substantial assistance motion can be abused and there is
evidence that federal prosecutors are misusing substantial assis-
tance. If the Department of Justice is to maintain substantial assis-
tance in its present form, it must put its house in order by institut-
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ing measures which eliminate the use of substantial assistance
departures as a plea bargaining incentive for the undeserving, and
limit the dramatic disparities in substantial assistance practices
between U.S. Attorneys' Offices. I hope this Article will serve as a
small stimulus toward that desirable end.
VII. AFTERWORD
As this Article went to press, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, unani-
mously reversed the decision of the panel in In re Sealed Case."
The full court held that "it is clear that by authorizing [substantial
assistance] departures with government motions, the Commission
did intend to preclude departures without motions." " The Su-
preme Court's decision in Koon liberalizing the general standard for
departures under the Guidelines, did not, in the view of the en banc
court, alter the plain meaning of the language of § 5K1.1. '
245. See In re Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines's "Substantial Assistance"), No.
97-3112 1999 WL 462422 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 1999) (en banc) (to be reported at 181 F.3d
128).
246. Id. at *2. The court relied particularly on the fact that the Sentencing Commis-
sion borrowed the phrasing of § 5K1.1 from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Rule 35(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "whose preclusive meaning is well-established." Id.
at **2-3.
247. Id. at **6-10.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Stetson L. Rev. 67 1999-2000
HeinOnline  -- 29 Stetson L. Rev. 68 1999-2000
